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Van Groningen: Thou Shalt Reasonably Focus on Its Context: Analyzing Public Dis

THOU SHALT REASONABLY FOCUS ON ITS
CONTEXT: ANALYZING PUBLIC DISPLAYS
OF THE TEN COMMANDMENTS
I. INTRODUCTION
Judge Roy S. Moore, former Chief Justice of the Alabama Supreme
Court, brought public displays of the Ten Commandments into the
headlines during the summer of 2003 when he refused to obey a federal
judge’s order to remove a two-ton granite monument displaying the Ten
Commandments from the rotunda of the Alabama Judicial Building.1
His refusal to remove the monument instigated a spirited quest by many
to allow the monument to remain in the rotunda.2
Although Judge Moore brought the issue of public Ten
Commandments displays into the public arena, it was not an unfamiliar
issue to the courts.3 Beginning in 1973, citizens of various cities began
1
See, e.g., Arian Campo-Flores, Roy Moore’s Holy War; The ‘Ten Commandments Judge’
Always Loves a Fight, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 1, 2003, at 38, available at 2002 WL 8639747. In 2001,
Judge Moore had placed this monument in the rotunda during the middle of the night.
Kyle Wingfield, Ten Commandments; Alabama Justice Loses His Job, AUGUSTA CHRON., Nov.
14, 2002, at A01, available at 2003 WL 67799072. On November 13, 2003, a judicial ethics
panel removed Judge Moore from the Alabama Supreme Court for his refusal to remove
the monument from the rotunda. Id. Judge Moore had previously gained attention for a
Ten Commandments display when a 1994 lawsuit was filed against him as a circuit court
judge to remove the Ten Commandments from his courtroom. Campo-Flores, supra, at 38.
2
See, e.g., Melissa Mullins, Ten Commandments Caravan Headed for Washington,
CYBERCAST NEWS SERVICE, Sept. 29, 2003, at http://www.cnsnews.com/Culture/archive/
200309/CUL20030929c.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004) (describing the five state “Save the
Commandments Caravan” Tour, which ended at the Supreme Court in October 2003
asking the Supreme Court to hear Judge Moore’s case and to declare the Ten
Commandments the moral foundation of the U.S. Constitution). Politicians also sought to
keep Judge Moore’s monument available to the public. See Alabama Declines Offer to House
Monument, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Sept. 5, 2003, at 5B, available at 2003 WL 4884320
(reporting that Governor Ronnie Musgrave of Mississippi offered to display Judge Moore’s
monument for a week in Mississippi and that he would encourage other governors to
display the monument); Erin Stephenson, Religion Can’t Be Mandate, FORT COLLINS
COLORADOAN, Sept. 1, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL 57879422 (reporting that former
presidential candidate Alan Keyes led protests defying the federal judge’s orders to remove
the monument).
3
See infra text accompanying note 5. In addition to Ten Commandments displays at
courthouses, courts have considered the constitutionality of Ten Commandments displays
at public schools. This Note will not address Ten Commandments displays in public
schools. For cases regarding this issue, see Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980); Baker v.
Adams County, 310 F.3d 927 (6th Cir. 2002); DiLoreto v. Downy Unified School District Board of
Education, 196 F.3d 958 (9th Cir. 1999); Doe v. Harlan County School District, 96 F. Supp. 2d
667 (E.D. Ky. 2000). For statutes authorizing displays of Ten Commandments in schools,
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challenging the constitutionality of Ten Commandments monuments
donated by the Fraternal Order of Eagles.4 Twenty years later, when the
Eleventh Circuit ruled on Judge Moore’s monument, five federal courts
of appeals, various federal district courts, and one state supreme court
had issued holdings on public Ten Commandments displays.5
In analyzing Ten Commandments displays, courts have employed
the Endorsement Test, a modification of the Lemon Test, which focuses
on the perceptions of a reasonable observer.6 However, courts have not
always used a uniform reasonable observer standard. The reasonable
observer may be informed: a reasonable observer in the Third Circuit
knows the approximate age of a Ten Commandments plaque;7 and a
reasonable observer in the Eleventh Circuit knows that Judge Moore
campaigned under the slogan “Ten Commandments Judge.”8 The
reasonable observer may be an uninformed passerby: a reasonable
observer in the Sixth Circuit is unable to identify a unifying theme
between the Ten Commandments, the Magna Carta, the Mayflower
Compact, and other historical documents;9 and a reasonable observer in
the Seventh Circuit concludes endorsement after viewing the Ten
Commandments without first looking at the other documents in the
display.10 The result of applying different standards of the reasonable

see N.C. GEN. ST. § 115C-81 (2001); N.D. CENT. CODE § 15.1-06-17.1 (2003); S.D. CODIFIED
LAWS § 13-24-17.1 (Michie 2002). For law review articles discussing Ten Commandments
displays in schools, see Tarik Abdel-Monem, Note, Posting the Ten Commandments as a
Historical Document in Public Schools, 87 IOWA L. REV. 1023 (2002); Robert G. Hensley, Jr.,
Comment, Written in Stone: Why Renewed Attempts to Post the Ten Commandments in Public
Schools Will Likely Fail, 81 N.C. L. REV. 801 (2003).
4
See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
5
The Third, Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits had issued rulings on public
Ten Commandments displays prior to Judge Moore’s case. See infra text accompanying
notes 112-14, 119-24, 133-40, and 146-56. The Fifth and Sixth Circuits ruled on Ten
Commandments displays in the months following the Moore case. See infra text
accompanying notes 138-43 and 157-63. The Eighth Circuit also ruled on a Ten
Commandments monument following the Moore case, but the decision was vacated. See
ACLU v. City of Plattsmouth, 358 F.3d 1020 (8th Cir. 2004), vacated by No. 02-2444, 2004 U.S.
App. LEXIS 6636 (8th Cir. Apr. 6, 2004). The Colorado Supreme Court ruled on a public
Ten Commandments display. See infra note 119. See infra notes 142 and 161 for district
courts that have issued holdings on Ten Commandments displays.
6
See infra Part III.C.
7
See infra text accompanying note 135.
8
See infra text accompanying note 140.
9
See infra text accompanying note 161.
10
See infra text accompanying note 156.
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observer is that courts issue inconsistent holdings regarding public Ten
Commandments displays.11
Because the number of challenges to public Ten Commandments
displays continues to grow12 and because politicians are seeking to enact
laws allowing the Ten Commandments to be posted on government
property,13 courts need a method to analyze Ten Commandments
See infra text accompanying notes 168-70.
Mary Jacoby, The Teen, an Alderman, and Ten Commandments, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES,
Aug. 17, 2003, at 1A, available at 2003 WL 56464320 (stating that in the 1990s there was only
one significant ruling on the Ten Commandments, but that federal courts have ruled on
Ten Commandments displays seventeen times since 2000); see also Warren Richey, Ten
Commandments Challenges Spread; Disputes Have Arisen in 14 States; Many Rulings Go Against
the Displays, CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Aug. 4, 2003, at 01, available at 2003 WL 5254701
(reporting that at the beginning of August 2002, disputes concerning Ten Commandments
displays were underway in Arizona, Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts,
Montana, Nebraska, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Washington, and Wisconsin). Within a
nine-day period in September of 2003, two new lawsuits were filed against local
government entities for Ten Commandments displays. See ACLU Sues Barrow County Over
Court’s Commandments, AUGUSTA CHRON., Sept. 17, 2003, at B06, available at 2003 WL
63410456 (reporting that on September 16, 2003, the ACLU filed suit against Barrow
County, Georgia for its display of the Ten Commandments at the county courthouse);
Separationists Sue Over Pl. Grove Tablet, DESERET MORNING NEWS, Sept. 26, 2003, at B02,
available at 2003 WL 64082380 (reporting that the Society of Separationists filed suit against
the City of Pleasant Grove, Utah on September 25, 2003, for its display of the Ten
Commandments in the local city park).
13
On October 21, 2003, Representative Cliff Stearns of Florida introduced a bill in the
United States House of Representatives proposing that the Architect of the Capital place a
copy of the Ten Commandments in the United States Capital Building. H.R. Con. Res. 310,
108th Cong. (2003), http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c108query.html. On May 9, 2003,
Representative Robert Aderholt of Alabama, along with 102 other Representatives,
introduced the “Ten Commandments Defense Act of 2003.” H.R. 2045, 108th Cong. (2003),
http://thomas.loc.gov/home/c108query.html. This Act would reserve all power to
display the Ten Commandments on government property to each of the States. Id.
Although this bill was introduced before the controversy surrounding Judge Moore, Rep.
Aderholt has used the public outcry to tout his bill. See Press Release, Americans United
for Separation of Church and State, Alabama Lawmaker Promotes Unconstitutional ‘Ten
Commandments Defense Act,’ (Sept. 4, 2003), http://www.au.org/site/News2?abbr=
pr&page=NewsArticle&id=5057&security=1002&news_iv_ctrl=1346 (last visited Aug. 19,
2004). Cf. Associated Press, God Declared ‘Foundation of Our National Heritage,’ LEXINGTON
HERALD LEADER, Oct. 24, 2003, at B4, available at 2003 WL 65040794 (reporting that several
Tennessee counties have passed a resolution recognizing “God as the foundation of our
national heritage,” and that several counties have also passed resolutions approving the
posting of the Ten Commandments in government buildings); Laura A. Bischoff, Ten
Commandments Debate May Arise, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 8, 2003, at B1, available at 2003
WL 68275820 (reporting that an Ohio State Representative is sponsoring a resolution that
would declare the Ten Commandments the “moral underpinning” of government).
The State of Indiana has already enacted a law authorizing the Ten Commandments
to be publicly displayed. See IND. CODE ANN. § 4-20.5-21-2 (West 2002). This statute
permits the Ten Commandments to be displayed on any property owned by the state when
11
12
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displays that will provide consistent results. This Note will address the
constitutionality of public displays of the Ten Commandments under the
Establishment Clause and will propose a new test that focuses on the
type of the Ten Commandments displays. First, this Note will discuss
the present constitutional framework for analyzing challenges to the
Establishment Clause.14 Second, this Note will explore how courts have
analyzed public Ten Commandments displays.15 Third, this Note will
analyze those court decisions.16 Fourth, this Note will provide a model
test for courts to use in analyzing public displays of the Ten
Commandments.17
II. THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
The First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion.”18 During the past 225 years,
three different theories of the Establishment Clause have become
entrenched in Establishment Clause jurisprudence: strict separation,
neutrality, and accommodation.19 Of the three theories, neutralism is the

it is displayed with other historical documents that have formed and influenced the United
States legal or governmental system. Id. Politicians may have success in enacting more
statutes like this one because the public supports Ten Commandments displays. See Larry
Copeland, Alabama Judge’s Monument Removed; 77% Back Ten Commandments Display, USA
TODAY, Aug. 28, 2003, at A.01, available at 2003 WL 5317808 (citing a USA
Today/CNN/Gallup Poll which showed that 77% of Americans opposed the removal of
the Ten Commandments from the Alabama Judicial Building); Poll Favors Commandments
Display, TULSA WORLD, Sept. 7, 2003, at A22, available at 2003 WL 7319671 (citing a survey
which reported that 73% of Oklahomans would support placing a monument displaying
the Ten Commandments in the Oklahoma Supreme Court Building).
14
See infra Part II.
15
See infra Part III.
16
See infra Part IV.
17
See infra Part V.
18
U.S. CONST. amend. I. In its entirety, the First Amendment reads, “Congress shall
make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people
peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.” Id.
The First Amendment is applied to state and local governments pursuant to the Fourteenth
Amendment. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940).
19
ERWIN CHEMERINKSY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 12.2.1 (2d ed.
2002). Strict separationists seek to erect a wall between church and state and to keep the
wall “high and impregnable.” Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 18 (1947). Neutralists
believe government should not favor religion over secularism or secularism over religion.
CHEMERINSKY, supra, § 12.2.1. Accomodationists allow for government to recognize
religion so long as government does not establish a church or coerce religious participation.
Id.
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most advocated theory,20 and it has recently established a strong
foothold in Establishment Clause jurisprudence due to Justice
O’Connor’s introduction of the Endorsement Test, a test designed to
promote neutrality.21 Part II of this Note will discuss the development
and the application of the Endorsement Test. Part II.A will explain the
Lemon Test, the Endorsement Test’s predecessor.22 Part II.B will trace the
development of the Endorsement Test through the concurring opinions
of Justice O’Connor.23 Finally, Part II.C will explore how federal circuits
have applied the Endorsement Test.24
A. The Lemon Test
In 1971, the Supreme Court ushered in a new era of Establishment
Clause jurisprudence when it announced for the first time, in Lemon v.
Kurtzman,25 an analysis for alleged Establishment Clause violations.26
After Lemon, to withstand a challenge to the Establishment Clause,
20
Several reasons exist for why neutralism is the most advocated theory. First, the
theory of strict separation has generally been abolished. Id. The Supreme Court has
repeatedly denied the proposition that government must be separated from religion by a
wall. See, e.g., Corp. of Presiding Bishop Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (allowing the Deseret Gymnasium, a public facility associated
with the Mormon Church, to discriminate on religious grounds in hiring for nonreligious
jobs); Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983) (upholding the State of Nebraska’s tradition
of opening each legislative session with prayer by a chaplain who is paid out of public
funds). Even when the Court stated, “The First Amendment has erected a wall between
church and state. That wall must be kept high and impregnable. We could not approve the
slightest breach,” it did not require strict separation. Everson, 330 U.S. at 18. In Everson, the
Court upheld a New Jersey statute, which authorized parents to be reimbursed for the
costs incurred for transporting their children to sectarian schools. Id. Second, neutralism
appeals to many because “it evokes the image of a government which can stand
dispassionately above the fray, shunning involvement in religious disputes while
maintaining a fair and impartial stance that offends none of the parties to such disputes.”
Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: Establishment Neutrality and the
‘No Endorsement’ Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 313 (1987).
21
See infra Parts II.B.3, II.B.5, II.C, III.C.
22
See infra Part II.A.
23
See infra Part II.B.
24
See infra Part II.C.
25
403 U.S. 602 (1971). In Lemon, the plaintiffs challenged two state statutes, which
authorized the expenditure of government funds to church-related schools. Id. at 606. A
Rhode Island statute authorized the state to supplement the salaries of teachers in
nonpublic schools if, among other criteria, the teacher only taught subjects which were
taught in public schools. Id. at 608. A Pennsylvania statute allowed the state to reimburse
nonpublic schools for teacher salaries, textbooks, and instructional materials if the teachers
taught secular subjects and the textbooks and materials were used for secular subjects. Id.
at 609-10.
26
Id. at 612-13.
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government action must have a secular purpose, its primary effect must
neither advance nor inhibit religion, and it must not foster an excessive
entanglement between government and religion.27
For approximately the next fifteen years, the Court applied the
Lemon Test to almost all alleged Establishment Clause violations.28
27
After applying these three prongs to the Rhode Island and Pennsylvania statutes, the
Court declared both statutes unconstitutional. Id. at 607. The Court held that both states
had a secular purpose in enacting the statutes—to “enhance the quality of the secular
education in all schools covered by the compulsory attendance laws.” Id. at 613. The Court
did not reach a conclusion on whether the primary purpose of the statutes was to advance
or inhibit religion because the Court concluded that the statutes created an excessive
entanglement between government and religion. Id. at 613-14. The Court wrote:
We need not and do not assume that teachers in parochial schools will
be guilty of bad faith or any conscious design to evade the limitations
imposed by the statute and the First Amendment. We simply
recognize that a dedicated religious person, teaching in a school
affiliated with his or her faith and operated to inculcate its tenets, will
inevitably experience great difficulty in remaining religiously neutral.
Id. at 618. The Court reasoned that because government surveillance would be needed to
make sure that the statutes were complied with, the statutes created an excessive
entanglement. Id. at 619.
The Court took these three prongs from two previous Supreme Court cases; the first
two prongs came from Board of Education v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968) and the third prong
came from Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Id. at 612-13. In Allen, the Court
upheld New York’s Education Law, which required local public schools to lend textbooks
free of charge to all students in grades seven through twelve, regardless of whether the
student attended a public or parochial school. 392 U.S. at 236-37. The Court stated the test
for determining which contacts between church and state were permissible under the
Establishment Clause was “[W]hat are the purpose and primary effect of the enactment?”
Id. at 243. The Court held that New York’s purpose in enacting the statute, to further the
educational opportunities of the students, was a legitimate purpose. Id. The Court further
held that the primary effect of the statute was not to promote religion because parochial
schools would not use the textbooks to teach religion. Id. at 248. In Walz, the Court upheld
a New York City tax exemption granted to religious organizations for property used solely
for religious worship. 397 U.S. at 664. In its reasoning, the Court stated, “We must also be
sure that the end result—the effect—is not an excessive government entanglement with
religion.” Id. at 674. The Court reasoned that New York City did not excessively entangle
itself with religion because in granting the tax exemption, New York City did not transfer
any of its revenue to a church, but rather, it only refrained from demanding certain taxes.
Id. at 675. The Court further reasoned that the tax exemption did not create excessive
entanglement because the exemption restricted the fiscal relationship between the city and
the churches. Id. at 676.
28
The Court did not apply the Lemon Test in Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783 (1983). In
Marsh, the Court upheld Nebraska’s practice of paying a chaplain to pray before each
legislative session. Id. at 783-84. The Court noted the long historical practice of opening
legislative sessions with prayer: the Continental Congress opened each session with a
prayer by a paid chaplain; the First Congress adopted a policy of selecting a chaplain to
open each session with prayer; and the First Congress adopted this policy three days before
the language of the Bill of Rights was agreed upon. Id. at 783-88. The Court reasoned that
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Although the Lemon Test was applied consistently, it was not without its
opponents.29 Despite the opposition, a new test for Establishment Clause
challenges did not begin to form and to take root until 1984 when Justice

because the First Congress agreed to open its sessions with a prayer by a government paid
chaplain before it adopted the language of the First Amendment, the framers “saw no real
threat to the Establishment Clause arising from a practice of prayer similar to that now
challenged.” Id. at 791.
29
A frequent criticism of the Lemon Test was that it led to inconsistent, and often
irreconcilable, results. See Jesse H. Choper, The Establishment Clause and Aid to Parochial
Schools—An Update, 75 CAL. L. REV. 5, 6-7 (1987) [hereinafter Choper, Establishment Clause].
Choper provided a list of inconsistent decisions by the Supreme Court after it began using
the Lemon Test: (1) government can finance bussing for children attending parochial
schools, but government cannot finance bussing from the parochial school to cultural and
scientific centers; (2) government can lend textbooks to children attending parochial
schools, but government cannot lend instructional materials to either the parochial school
or to the children attending the parochial school; (3) a public school teacher cannot enter a
parochial school to provide remedial services, but the public school teacher can provide
these services to children attending a parochial school when the children are outside of the
parochial school; and (4) government cannot finance achievement tests when the parochial
school prepares the tests, but government can finance achievement tests if the tests are
prepared by state officials even if the tests are administered by parochial school teachers.
Id.
Another frequent criticism of the Lemon Test was that it created a tension between the
Establishment Clause and the Free Exercise Clause. Jesse H. Choper, The Endorsement Test:
Its Status and Desirability, 18 J.L. & POL. 499, 501 (2002) [hereinafter Choper, Endorsement
Test]. Because the first prong of the Lemon Test required a secular purpose, it seemingly
made all “exemptions from onerous obligations for religion unconstitutional.” Id.
Justice White repeatedly criticized the Lemon Test and argued that it imposed
unnecessary tests for analyzing alleged Establishment Clause violations. See, e.g., Roemer
v. Bd. of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 768 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (“The threefold test of
Lemon I imposes unnecessary, and . . . superfluous tests for establishing ‘when the State’s
involvement with religion passes the peril point’ for First Amendment purposes.”) (citation
omitted).
Despite all the criticism of the Lemon Test, no elaboration on it can compare with
Justice Scalia’s vivid description of it in 1993. See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 398-99 (1993) (Scalia, J., concurring). Justice Scalia, joined by
Justice Thomas, wrote, “Like some ghoul in a late-night horror movie that repeatedly sits
up in its grave and shuffles abroad, after being repeatedly killed and buried, Lemon stalks
our Establishment Clause jurisprudence once again, frightening the little child and school
attorneys of Center Moriches Union Free School District.” Id. at 398. He explained:
It is there to scare us (and our audience) when we wish it to do so, but
we can command it to return the tomb at will. When we wish to strike
down a practice it forbids, we invoke it; when we wish to uphold a
practice it forbids, we ignore it entirely. Sometimes, we take a middle
course, calling its three prongs “no more than helpful signposts.” Such
a docile and useful monster is worth keeping around, at least in a
somnolent state; one never knows when one might need him.
Id. at 399 (citations omitted).

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 7

226

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

O’Connor formulated the Endorsement Test, which she refined in a
series of concurring opinions.30
B. The Development of the Endorsement Test
The Endorsement Test started small in 1984, articulated by Justice
O’Connor in a concurring opinion not joined by any other Justice.31 But
it grew, and it was adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court five
years later and is still being used by the Court over twenty years later.32
1.

Lynch v. Donnelly: The Beginning of the Endorsement Test

In Lynch v. Donnelly,33 citizens of Pawtucket, Rhode Island, alleged
that the city’s holiday display, which included a crèche, a Santa Claus
house, reindeer, candy-striped poles, carolers, a Christmas tree, cut-outs
of a clown, an elephant, and a teddy bear, and a “Seasons Greetings”
banner, violated the Establishment Clause.34 Both the plurality and
Justice O’Connor, in a concurrence, held that the display did not violate
the Establishment Clause.35
a.

The Plurality Opinion

Applying the Lemon Test, the plurality held that the holiday display
was constitutional.36 The plurality began its analysis by noting that the

See infra Part II.B.
See infra Part II.B.1.b.
32
See infra Parts II.B.3, II.C.
33
465 U.S. 668 (1984). For articles discussing Lynch, see generally David C. Fairchild,
Lynch v. Donnelly: The Case for the Crèche, 29 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 459 (1985); William Van
Alstyne, Comment, Trends in the Supreme Court: Mr. Jefferson’s Crumbling Wall–A Comment
on Lynch v. Donnelly, 1984 DUKE L.J. 770 (1984).
34
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671. The city erected the holiday display in a park owned by a
nonprofit organization. Id. A crèche is a visual representation of the manger scene shortly
after the birth of Jesus in Bethlehem. County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 580
(1989). The crèche is an inherently religious symbol and to Christians, it is the “central
religious symbol of the Christmas holiday.” Id. at 627. The crèche in Lynch consisted of
figurines, ranging in size from five feet to five inches, of Baby Jesus, Mary, Joseph, angels,
shepherds, kings, and animals. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 671.
35
Id. at 687. Chief Justice Burger wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices
Powell, White, and Rehnquist. Id. at 670.
36
Id. at 687. The Court repeatedly stated that the First Amendment does not require
complete separation between church and state: “[T]otal separation of the two is not
possible. . . . Nor does the Constitution require complete separation of church and state; it
affirmatively mandates accommodation. . . . [T]he Court consistently has declined to take a
rigid, absolutist view of the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 672, 673, 678.
30
31
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crèche must be examined within the context of the Christmas season.37
Given this context, the plurality reasoned that the city’s purposes of
celebrating the holiday season and depicting the origins of Christmas
were legitimate secular purposes.38 In assessing the effect of the display,
the plurality noted that some government advancement of religion is
permissible.39 Therefore, the plurality held that the display’s primary
effect was not to advance religion because the benefit to Christianity was
“indirect, remote and incidental.”40
b.

The Concurrence

Agreeing with the plurality that the holiday display did not violate
the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor began her concurrence by
stating that government can violate the Establishment Clause in one of
two ways: (1) excessive entanglement with private institutions; or (2)
endorsement or disapproval of religion.41 Justice O’Connor defined
endorsement as “send[ing] a message to nonadherents that they are
outsiders, not full members of the political community, and an
accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders, favored
Id. The Court cited two previous cases, Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980) and School
District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), in which the Court declared
certain religious practices unconstitutional, but left open the possibility that the same
religious practices might be constitutional within a different context. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 679.
For a discussion of Stone, see infra Part III.A. In Abington, the Court declared
unconstitutional two state laws, which required daily Bible reading in public schools. 374
U.S. at 203. But the Court rejected the notion that the Bible cannot have a legitimate
purpose in a student’s education. Id. at 225. The Court wrote:
It certainly may be said that the Bible is worthy of study for its literary
and historic qualities. Nothing we have said here indicates that such
study of the Bible or of religion, when presented objectively as part of
a secular program of education, may not be effected consistently with
the First Amendment.
Id.
38
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 681.
39
Id. Prior to making this statement, the Court looked at previous government actions it
had allowed: expenditures of public money on textbooks for sectarian schools,
expenditures of public money for transporting students to sectarian schools, tax
exemptions for church property, and federal grants to church-sponsored colleges. Id. at
681-82. The Court then stated, “We are unable to discern a greater aid to religion deriving
from inclusion of the crèche than from these benefits and endorsements previously held
not violative of the Establishment Clause.” Id. at 682.
40
Id. at 683.
41
Id. at 688. Justice O’Connor explained that excessive entanglement between
government and religious institutions could lead to religious institutions losing their
independence, religious institutions receiving access to government or to governmental
powers, and creating political constituencies based on religious belief. Id. She then stated
that excessive entanglement was not an issue. Id. at 689.
37
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members of the political community. Disapproval sends the opposite
message.”42 In determining whether government has endorsed religion,
Justice O’Connor said that two messages must be analyzed: (1) the
message government intended to convey; and (2) the message actually
conveyed.43
To analyze a challenge to the Establishment Clause focusing on these
two messages, Justice O’Connor refined both the purpose prong and the
effects prong of the Lemon Test.44 According to Justice O’Connor, the
relevant question under the purpose prong became “whether the
government intends to convey a message of endorsement or disapproval
of religion.”45 As to the effects prong, Justice O’Connor stated that a
government practice may not have the effect of communicating a
message of endorsement.46 She then explained that a setting may change
the message of the display.47 In finding the display constitutional, Justice

42
Id. at 688. Some commentators have labeled this the “outsiders argument.” See
generally W. Scott Simpson, Lemon Reconstituted: Justice O’Connor’s Proposed Modifications of
the Lemon Test for Establishment Clause Violations, 1986 BYU L. Rev. 465, 472 (1986) (“[S]tate
religiously-oriented activities should be closely scrutinized because they convey to
religious minorities, who do not participate in those activities, a sense that they are
outsiders.”).
43
Lynch, 465 U.S. at 690. Both messages must be analyzed, Justice O’Connor explained,
because some listeners do not rely solely on the words themselves, rather they will examine
the context of the message and ask questions of the speaker to discern the intended
message, while others will rely completely on the words themselves. Id.
44
Id. at 690-91.
45
Id. at 691. Justice O’Connor found that the state did not intend to convey a message of
endorsement through the crèche. Id. She stated the purpose in including the crèche in the
holiday display was to celebrate the holiday through its traditional symbols and not to
promote the religious content of the crèche. Id.
46
Id. at 692. Specifically, Justice O’Connor stated, “What is crucial is that a government
practice not have the effect of communicating a message of government endorsement or
disapproval of religion. It is only practices having that effect, whether intentionally or
unintentionally, that make religion relevant, in reality or public perception, to status in the
political community.” Id.
47
Id. In Lynch, Justice O’Connor implied that the relevant perceptions were the
perceptions of real human beings—either citizens of Pawtucket or citizens of the United
States. Smith, supra note 20, at 291. In his article, Smith criticized this approach, arguing
that allowing the perceptions of real humans to dictate would result in government
paralysis. Id. Because the United States has such a great diversity of religions, almost any
government action would be seen as an endorsement of religion by someone. Id. He also
argued that allowing the perceptions to be based on a majority of citizens’ feelings would
contradict the purpose of the Endorsement Test, because the religious viewpoint of the
majority would be endorsed, while ignoring the religious choices of the minority. Id. at
292.
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O’Connor did not deny the religious nature of the crèche, but stated that
the holiday setting negated any message of endorsement.48
2.

Wallace v. Jaffree: The Observer Becomes Objective

Justice O’Connor commenced her refinement of the Endorsement
Test a year later in Wallace v. Jaffree.49 In Wallace, the plaintiffs challenged
three Alabama statutes that provided for a minute of silence in all public
schools for meditation or prayer and that authorized teachers to lead
willing students in a prayer addressed to “Almighty God.”50 A plurality
and Justice O’Connor, in a concurrence, held that the statutes violated
the Establishment Clause.51
Justice O’Connor began her analysis of the statutes by stating that
the Endorsement Test precludes government from conveying or
attempting to convey a message that certain religious beliefs are favored,
but that it does not preclude government from acknowledging religion.52
48
Lynch, 465 U.S at 692. Justice O’Connor compared the crèche in the holiday display to
a religious painting in a museum. Id. Just as the museum setting negated any message of
religious endorsement from a painting, the holiday display negated any religious
endorsement from the crèche. Id.
She also compared the crèche to other government “acknowledgements” of religion
such as legislative prayer, presidential declarations of Thanksgiving as a national holiday,
printing “In God We Trust” on coins, and opening Supreme Court sessions with “God save
the United States and this honorable court.” Id. at 692-93. Because these government
acknowledgements have the purpose “of solemnizing public occasions, expressing
confidence in the future, and encouraging the recognition of what is worthy of appreciation
in society,” and because of their “history and ubiquity,” these practices do not have the
effect of endorsing religion. Id. at 693.
49
472 U.S. 38 (1985). For articles discussing the Court’s holding in Wallace, see generally
Rodney K. Smith, Now is the Time for Reflection: Wallace v. Jaffree and its Legislative
Aftermath, 37 ALA. L. REV. 345 (1986); Patrick F. Brown, Note, Wallace v. Jaffree and the Need
to Reform Establishment Clause Analysis, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 573 (1986); Douglas E. Hoffman,
Comment, Establishment Clause Analysis: An Apology for the Lemon Test in the Wake of
Wallace v. Jaffree, 30 S.D. L. REV. 599 (1985).
50
Wallace, 472 U.S. at 40.
51
Id. at 61, 67. Justice Stevens wrote the plurality opinion and was joined by Justices
Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall. Id. at 40. Justice Powell wrote a concurring opinion. Id.
at 62.
The plurality declared the statutes unconstitutional because the Alabama legislature
lacked a secular purpose in enacting the statutes. Id. at 56. The plurality looked at
statements made by Senator Donald Holmes, the sponsor of the statutes, in which he said
that he wanted to put voluntary prayer back into schools. Id. at 57.
52
Id. at 70. At the beginning of her concurrence, Justice O’Connor articulated two
reasons for why she believed the Endorsement Test was the better test for alleged
Establishment Clause violations: (1) the Endorsement Test was capable of consistent
application; and (2) the Endorsement Test inquired into the legislative purpose. Id. at 6869.
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As to the purpose prong, Justice O’Connor agreed with the plurality that
Alabama lacked any secular purpose for the statutes.53 As to the effects
prong, Justice O’Connor enunciated a succinct question for courts to use
in analyzing the effect: “[W]hether an objective observer, acquainted
with the text, legislative history, and implementation of the statute,
would perceive it as a state endorsement of prayer in public schools.”54
3.

County of Allegheny v. ACLU: The Adoption of the Endorsement Test

The next major progression in the development of the Endorsement
Test occurred four years later in County of Allegheny v. ACLU.55 In
Allegheny, the plaintiffs challenged two holiday displays: (1) a crèche on
the Grand Staircase of the Allegheny County Courthouse; and (2) a
menorah placed alongside a forty-five foot decorated Christmas tree
outside Pittsburgh’s City-County Building.56 The Court held, vis-à-vis
five opinions, that the crèche, but not the menorah, violated the
Id. at 77.
Id. at 76. Because she had already concluded that the statutes violated the purpose
prong, Justice O’Connor did not analyze the effects on the objective observer other than to
say it seemed likely that the message conveyed to the objective observer was approval of
the child who chose prayer over the available alternatives. Id. at 78.
In Wallace, Justice O’Connor changed the relevant perceptions; the relevant
perceptions are no longer from any person but from an objective observer. Id. This
approach has been met with much criticism. See William P. Marshall, “We Know It When
We See It” The Supreme Court and Establishment, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 495, 536-37 (1986) (arguing
that true objectivity will never be achieved because people, whether areligious,
separationists, or agnostics, would rather assume themselves as reasonable than use an
external standard); Smith, supra note 20, at 292-95. Smith criticized this approach because
the hypothetical objective observer will only know as much as its maker wants to know
and because the hypothetical objective observer will be deemed aware of the legislative
history, allowing the observer to know the government’s purpose, thus collapsing the two
prongs of the Endorsement Test into one prong. Smith, supra note 20, at 292-95.
55
492 U.S. 573 (1989). For articles discussing the Court’s holding in Allegheny, see
generally George M. Janocsko, Beyond the “Plastic Reindeer Rule”: The Curious Case of
County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 445 (1990); Steven
A. Seidman, County of Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union: Embracing the
Endorsement Test, 9 J.L. & RELIGION 211 (1991); Keith O. McArtor, Note and Comment, A
Conservative Struggles with Lemon: Justice Anthony M. Kennedy’s Dissent in Allegheny, 26
TULSA L.J. 107 (1990); Shahin Rezai, Note, County of Allegheny v. ACLU: Evolution of Chaos
in Establishment Clause Analysis, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 503 (1990); Jeffrey R. Wagener, Comment,
A Survey of the Supreme Court’s Approach to the Establishment Clause in Light of County of
Allegheny v. American Civil Liberties Union, 35 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 169 (1990).
56
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 578. Alongside the menorah and tree was a sign saluting liberty.
Id. A menorah is a nine-branched candelabrum used by Jews to celebrate the holiday of
Hanukkah. ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1438 (3d Cir. 1997). The lighting of the
candles in the menorah is the central event of Hanukkah. Id. However, Hanukkah is not
one of the main religious holidays in Judaism. Id.
53
54
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Establishment Clause.57 For the first time, and despite a strenuous
objection from Justice Kennedy, a majority of the Court used the
Endorsement Test to analyze a challenge to the Establishment Clause.58

Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 574. Justice Blackmun delivered the opinion of the Court,
concluding that the crèche, but not the menorah, violated the Establishment Clause. Id. at
578-621. Justice O’Connor wrote a concurring opinion. Id. at 623-37. Justice Brennan wrote
an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, arguing that both displays violated
the Establishment Clause. Id. at 637-46. Justice Stevens wrote an opinion concurring in
part and dissenting in part, also arguing that both displays violated the Establishment
Clause. Id. at 646-55. Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion concurring in part and dissenting
in part, arguing that both the crèche and the menorah were constitutional displays. Id. at
670-78.
58
Id. at 593-94. Justice Blackmun, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall, Stevens, and
O’Connor, wrote, “The Establishment Clause, at the very least, prohibits government from
appearing to take a position on questions of religious belief or from ‘making adherence to a
religion relevant in any way to a person’s standing in the political community.’” Id.
(quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
In his dissent, Justice Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia
and White, articulated three arguments against the Endorsement Test. Allegheny, 492 U.S.
at 670-78. First, he argued that the Endorsement Test, if applied faithfully, would
invalidate many of the country’s traditional practices. Id. at 671. He provided the example
of Thanksgiving Proclamations, through which Presidents have established a national day
of celebration and prayer. Id. He wrote, “It requires little imagination to conclude that
these proclamations would cause nonadherents to feel excluded, yet they have been a part
of our national heritage from the beginning.” Id. Justice Kennedy reasoned:
Either the endorsement test must invalidate scores of traditional
practices recognizing the place religion holds in our culture, or it must
be twisted and stretched to avoid inconsistency with practices we
know to have been permitted in the past, while condemning similar
practices with no greater endorsement effect simply by reason of their
lack of historical antecedent. Neither result is acceptable.
Id. at 674.
Second, Justice Kennedy argued that allowing a religious display to have its meaning
changed because of its context allows for a “jurisprudence of minutiae.” Id. In Justice
Kennedy’s words, the Endorsement Test:
[C]ould provide workable guidance to the lower courts, if ever, only
after this Court has decided a long series of holiday display cases,
using little more than intuition and a tape measure. Deciding cases on
the basis of such unguided examination of marginalia is irreconcilable
with the imperative of applying neutral principles in constitutional
adjudication.
Id. at 675-76.
Third, Justice Kennedy argued that “the clearest illustration of the unwisdom of the
endorsement test” is that the Endorsement Test lends itself to an inquiry of how many
adhere to a particular religion, and he stated: “Those religions enjoying the largest
following must be consigned to the status of least favored faiths so as to avoid any possible
risk of offending members of minority religions.” Id. at 677. In one final statement of
disgust for the Endorsement Test, Justice Kennedy said, “Indeed, were I required to choose
57
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Justice O’Connor, along with Justices Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall,
and Stevens, held that the crèche violated the Establishment Clause.59 In
its reasoning, the Court stated that the crèche communicated a religious
message.60 The Court differentiated this crèche from the crèche in
Lynch.61 Unlike the crèche in Lynch, the crèche in the Allegheny
between the approach taken by the majority and a strict separationist view, I would have to
respect the consistency of the latter.” Id. at 678.
Despite Justice Kennedy’s denouncement of the Endorsement Test, Justice O’Connor
continued to believe that the Endorsement Test asked the right questions about religious
displays and that it was capable of consistent application. Id. at 628-29. Justice O’Connor
explained that the Endorsement Test would not invalidate long-standing religious practices
because imputing the reasonable observer with knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of
the challenged action would provide part of the context. Id. at 630-31.
Justice Kennedy also articulated his own test for alleged Establishment Clause
violations: the Coercion Test. Id. at 659. Under the Coercion Test, government action is
not unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause unless government coerces someone
to support or to participate in a religious exercise or if government gives direct benefits to
religious organizations in such a way as to create a state religion. Id. Applying the
Coercion Test to the crèche and the menorah, Justice Kennedy found both displays
constitutional because no one was compelled to participate in a religious activity,
government did not spend significant amounts of taxpayer money to pay for the displays,
and because the crèche and menorah were passive displays. Id. at 664. He further
explained that any person who disagreed with the crèche or menorah could easily ignore it.
Id.
Justice Kennedy, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Justices White, Scalia, and Thomas have
continued to adhere to the Coercion Test. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992).
However, Justice Kennedy and Justice Scalia have articulated different definitions of
coercion. Id. at 636-44. According to Justice Scalia, coercion carries with it the “force of law
and threat of penalty.” Id. at 640. But according to Justice Kennedy, coercion can be subtle
and indirect. Id. at 592-93.
In Lee, the plaintiffs challenged a school policy that allowed the principle to invite
clergy to give non-sectarian prayers at middle school and high school graduations. Id. at
580. Justice Kennedy, writing for the Court, found the policy unconstitutional because the
school’s control of the graduation ceremony placed public and peer pressure on the
graduating students to join the clergy in the prayer. Id. at 586, 593. Justice Scalia, writing
for the dissent, found the policy to be constitutional because the graduating students were
not required to attend the graduation ceremonies and because the students received no
punishment for not joining the clergy in prayer. Id. at 640-44.
Justice Kennedy has continued to hold that coercion can be accomplished through
social pressure. See Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290, 297-98 (2000). In Santa
Fe, Justice Kennedy joined five other Justices in striking down a high school policy that
allowed student led prayers before high school football games. Id. As part of its reasoning,
the Court explained that many students feel pressure to attend high school football games.
Id. at 310-13.
59
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 602.
60
Id. at 598. The Court stated the crèche’s religious meaning was “unmistakably clear”
because it portrayed the nativity scene and because the words “Glory to God in the
Highest” were written above the angel. Id.
61
Id. For a description of the crèche’s context in Lynch, see supra text accompanying note
34.
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Courthouse had nothing in its context to detract from its religious
message.62 Finally, the Court noted the location of the crèche: the Grand
Staircase, the “most beautiful part” of the building.63 Because of this
location, the Court held that no reasonable viewer could think that
government did not support or approve the crèche.64
Justices O’Connor and Blackmun parted ways with Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Stevens, and joined Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Kennedy, Scalia, and White, in holding that the menorah was
constitutional.65 Justice Blackmun stated that the result of placing the
62
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 598. The County of Allegheny tried to argue that the crèche’s
context negated its religious message. Id. at 598-99. First, the county argued that the floral
decoration surrounding the crèche detracted from its religious message. Id. The Court
rejected this argument because the floral frame attracted the viewers’ attention to the
crèche. Id. at 599. Second, the county argued that the crèche’s religious message was
diminished because the crèche was in the background during the annual Christmas carol
program. Id. The Court rejected this argument because most viewers observed the crèche
when the choir was not singing and because most of the carols that were sung were
religious in nature. Id.
63
Id.
64
Id. at 598-600. Allegheny contains a dispute regarding the identity of the observer.
James M. Lewis & Michael L. Vild, Note, A Controversial Twist of Lemon: The Endorsement
Test as the New Establishment Clause Standard, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 671, 690-91 (1990).
Justice Kennedy, in his dissent, used the phrases “reasonable observer” and “objective
observer”; whereas, Justices Blackmun and O’Connor only used the phrase “reasonable
observer.” Id. Lewis and Vild argued that because both Justices Blackmun and O’Connor
used only “reasonable observer” that they viewed a reasonable observer as an
improvement over an objective observer. Id. However, they contend that a reasonable
observer is not an improvement. Id. They noted that “reasonable,” when used in other
contexts such as torts, contracts, or criminal law is always used to standardize judgment.
Id. at 691. They argued that one cannot standardize judgment in regards to religion, and
wrote, “[A] reasonable Jew will have a different perspective than a reasonable Protestant or
a reasonable Muslim, and a reasonable Atheist will have a different perspective than any
Theist.” Id. at 692. They concluded, “Whereas reasonable people of different religions may
agree upon the standard of care in building a haystack, they are likely to disagree on what
constitutes an endorsement of religion.” Id. at 692-93; cf. ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209
F. Supp. 2d 799, 814 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). In Rutherford County, the court stated, “[R]eligious
differences create more deep-seated emotions and harsh reactions than most any other
subject. Religious fervor has divided families, friends, neighbors, communities, and even
nations. The evening news is filled with accounts of nations embroiled in religious wars
and conflicts . . . .” Id.
65
Allegheny, 492 U.S. at 621-32, 637, 655. Although Justices Brennan, Marshall, and
Stevens agreed that the Endorsement Test was the correct test to use, they disagreed upon
its application to the menorah. Id. at 643. They disagreed that a Christmas tree, a largely
secular symbol of Christmas, could minimize the religious significance of the menorah. Id.
at 639. Justice Brennan wrote, “That the tree may, without controversy, be deemed a
secular symbol if found alone does not mean that it will be so seen when combined with
other symbols or objects.” Id. Rather, he argued that the menorah could bring back some
of the religious aspects of the Christmas tree. Id. at 640-43. He argued that because the
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menorah next to the Christmas tree created a holiday setting that
represented both Christmas and Chanukah.66 However, he explained
that the display’s constitutionality depended on whether Pittsburgh
intended to celebrate Christmas and Chanukah as religious holidays or
as secular holidays.67 He held that a reasonable observer would
conclude that Pittsburgh intended to celebrate them as secular holidays
because the Christmas tree, a secular symbol of Christmas, was the
dominant element in the display.68
Justice O’Connor came to a different conclusion about the message
received by a reasonable observer. Justice O’Connor’s reasonable
observer received the message that Pittsburgh was trying to
acknowledge cultural diversity and to convey tolerance of religious
beliefs by recognizing that the winter holiday is celebrated in a diversity
of ways.69 Justice O’Connor concluded that Pittsburgh conveyed a
message of pluralism by accompanying the Christmas tree, a secular
symbol, with a menorah, a Jewish symbol.70

reasonable observer could conclude either that the Christmas tree minimized the religious
significance of the menorah or that the menorah maximized the religious significance of the
Christmas tree that both messages had to be analyzed. Id. at 642.
In addition, Justice Brennan disagreed that the Christmas tree was the predominant
element in the display. Id. First, he argued that an eighteen-foot menorah was far more
eye-catching than a regularly sized Christmas tree; and second, he argued that the singlemessaged menorah dominated the Christmas tree, which lacked a clear message. Id. In
conclusion, Justice Brennan wrote, “I shudder to think that the only ‘reasonable observer’ is
one who shares the particular views on perspective, spacing, and accent expressed in
JUSTICE BLACKMUN’s opinion, thus making analysis under the Establishment Clause look
more like an exam in Art 101 than an inquiry into constitutional law.” Id. at 642-43.
66
Id. at 614.
67
Id. at 615. Justice Blackmun wrote, “The simultaneous endorsement of Judaism and
Christianity is no less constitutionally infirm than the endorsement of Christianity alone.”
Id.
68
Id. at 616-17. Justice Blackmun concluded that the forty-five foot Christmas tree was
the predominant element in the display because it occupied the central position beneath
the archway in the entrance to the City-County Building, while the eighteen-foot menorah
was positioned on one side of the Christmas tree. Id. at 617.
69
Id. at 635-36.
70
Id. at 635. Justice O’Connor stated that the religious significance of the menorah was
not neutralized by the Christmas tree or the liberty sign, but that the Christmas tree and the
liberty sign changed the message of the display. Id.
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4.

Capital Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette: The Knowledge of
the Reasonable Observer

The refinement of the Endorsement Test continued in Capital Square
Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette.71 In Pinette, Justice O’Connor and
Justice Stevens disagreed on the amount of knowledge that should be
imputed to the reasonable observer.72
Justice O’Connor began her concurrence by stating that the
Endorsement Test should not focus on the actual perceptions of
individuals, but rather on the perceptions of a reasonable observer who
is similar to the “reasonable person” in tort law.73 She then imputed
71
515 U.S. 753 (1995). In Pinette, the Ku Klux Klan applied for a permit to place a cross
on Capital Square, a ten-acre plaza surrounding the statehouse in Columbus, Ohio. Id. at
757-58. Although Capital Square had been used as a gathering place for speeches and
festivals for the past one hundred years, the Advisory Board denied the Ku Klux Klan’s
application. Id.
The plurality, consisting of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and
Thomas, held, using a forum analysis, that the Advisory Board violated the Ku Klux Klan’s
free speech rights because Capital Square was a public forum and because an
Establishment Clause defense did not justify the Advisory Board’s content-based restriction
in denying the Ku Klux Klan’s application. Id. at 761-63. The plurality refused to apply the
Endorsement Test because, as Justice Scalia explained, there was a crucial difference
between government speech endorsing religion and private speech, which the government
protects under the Free Speech and Free Exercise Clauses. Id. at 765. The Endorsement
Test was applied by Justice O’Connor, who wrote a concurring opinion joined by Justices
Souter and Breyer, and by Justice Stevens, who wrote a dissenting opinion. Id. at 772-83,
797-815.
For articles discussing the Court’s holding in Pinette, see generally Alberto B. Lopez,
Equal Access and the Public Forum: Pinette’s Imbalance of Free Speech and Establishment, 55
BAYLOR L. REV. 167 (2003); David Goldberger, Capital Square Review and Advisory Board
v. Pinette, Beware of Justice Scalia’s Per Se Rule, 6 GEO. MASON L. REV. 1 (1997); Philip C.
Kissam, Aesthetics of the Cross: Competing Interpretations of the Ku Klux Klan Cross in Capital
Square Review and Advisory Board v. Pinette, 5 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37 (Spring 1996);
Richard E. Levy, Dueling Values: Balancing Competing Constitutional Interests in Pinette, 5
KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 43 (Spring 1996).
72
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 800 n.5.
73
Id. at 778-80. Justice O’Connor argued that allowing the reasonable observer to be
based on the perceptions of an actual person would prohibit almost all governmental
displays because “[t]here is always someone who, with a particular quantum of knowledge,
reasonably might perceive a particular action as an endorsement of religion.” Id. at 780.
Justice O’Connor further argued that government has not made religion relevant to
political standing in the community merely because someone might feel uncomfortable
viewing a religious display. Id.
The “reasonable person” in tort law is someone who “is not to be identified with any
ordinary individual, who might occasionally do unreasonable things; he is a prudent and
careful person, who is always up to standard . . . he is rather a personification of a
community ideal of reasonable behavior, determined by the jury’s social judgment.” W.
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knowledge to the reasonable observer.74 First, after stating that the
knowledge of the reasonable observer is not limited to that simply
gleaned from viewing the display, she imputed the knowledge that the
cross is a religious symbol, that Capital Square was government
property, and that the large building nearby was the seat of the state
government.75 Second, she also accredited the reasonable observer with
knowledge of the general history of Capital Square and with the ability
to recognize the distinction between speech that government supports
and speech that government allows in a public forum.76
Justice Stevens disagreed with Justice O’Connor’s definition of the
reasonable observer.77
First, he argued that Justice O’Connor’s
reasonable observer is not equal to the reasonable person in tort law, but
is rather a “well-schooled jurist, a being finer than the tort-law model.”78
He explained, “The ideal human JUSTICE O’CONNOR describes knows
and understands much more than meets the eye.”79 Second, Justice
Stevens advocated a per se rule that the location of a stationary,
unattended display is an implicit endorsement by the party or person

PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 32, at 175 (W. Page
Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984).
74
Pinette, 515 U.S. at 780.
75
Id. at 780-81. Justice Stevens also agreed that this knowledge should be imputed to the
reasonable observer. Id. at 806-07.
76
Id. at 780-82. Because a reasonable observer would know the general history of
Capital Square, the reasonable observer, according to Justice O’Connor, would also know
that Capital Square was a public park that had been used by various speakers in the past.
Id. at 780.
For Justice O’Connor, the setting of the cross became as much a part of the context as
did its location on government property. Id. Because a reasonable observer would know
the difference between speech that government supports and speech that the government
allows, Justice O’Connor concluded that a reasonable observer would not see the Ku Klux
Klan’s cross as an endorsement of religion. Id. at 782.
77
Id. at 800 n.5.
78
Id. Justice Stevens wrote:
I think this enhanced tort-law standard is singularly out of place in the
Establishment Clause context. It strips of constitutional protection
every reasonable person whose knowledge happens to fall below some
“‘ideal’” standard. Instead of protecting only the “ideal” observer,
then, I would extend protection to the universe of reasonable persons
and ask whether some viewers of the religious display would be likely
to perceive a government endorsement.
Id. Justice Stevens would not impute the reasonable observer with the knowledge that
Capital Square had housed prior private displays because, in his opinion, it was highly
unlikely that many viewers knew this information. Id. at 808.
79
Id. at 800 n.5.
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who owns that property.80 Because the cross was unattended and
located on government property, Justice Stevens concluded that the cross
violated the Establishment Clause.81
5.

Recent Establishment Clause Cases:
Remains Alive

The Reasonable Observer

In Establishment Clause cases following Pinette, the Supreme Court
has been less than clear about which test it is using.82 Nonetheless,
reasonable observer language still appears in the cases.83 In Santa Fe
Independent School District v. Doe,84 the Court, in striking down a school
policy that permitted student-led prayer before football games, stated,
“Regardless of the listener’s support for, or objection to, the message, an
objective Santa Fe High School student will unquestionably perceive the
inevitable pregame prayer as stamped with her school’s seal of
approval.”85 In Zelman v. Simmons-Harris,86 the Court, in upholding
Id. at 801. Therefore, a reasonable observer would conclude that any display or
symbol located on government property had been sponsored and endorsed by the
government. Id. This analysis, argued Justice Stevens, would provide First Amendment
protection to schoolchildren, traveling salesmen, and tourists who are not aware of the
public nature of Capital Square. Id. at 808 n.14.
81
Id. at 815.
82
See, e.g., Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe, 530 U.S. 290 (2000). The Court in Santa Fe
did not articulate which test it was using; rather, the Court stated that it was guided by the
following principle it had announced in Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577 (1992):
The principle that government may accommodate the free exercise of
religion does not supersede the fundamental limitations imposed by
the Establishment Clause. It is beyond dispute that, at a minimum, the
Constitution guarantees that government may not coerce anyone to
support or participate in religion or its exercise, or otherwise act in a
way which “establishes a [state] religion or religious faith, or tends to
do so.”
Id. at 302 (quoting Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 678 (1984)). The Court then analyzed
the school prayer policy under both the Endorsement Test and the Coercion Test. Id. at
301-13; see supra note 58 (explaining how the Coercion Test was applied in Santa Fe
Independent School District).
The Supreme Court has been ambiguous about the correct test to be applied in
analyzing alleged Establishment Clause violations, which has been made clear in opinions
by federal appellate courts. See, e.g., Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 256
(3d Cir. 2003) (“We must first determine the appropriate framework to use when analyzing
whether the Ten Commandments plaque violates the Establishment Clause, an inquiry that
is somewhat murky, even in light of the recent religious display cases decided by the
Supreme Court.”).
83
See infra notes 86-87.
84
530 U.S. 290 (2000).
85
Id. at 308. The school policy, entitled “Prayer at Football Games,” authorized two
student elections to determine if a prayer should be given before football games. Id. at 297.
In the first election, students would vote on whether a “message[],” “statement[],” or
80
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Ohio’s Pilot Project Scholarship Program, stated, “Any objective observer
familiar with the full history and context of the Ohio program would
reasonably view it as one aspect of a broader undertaking to assist poor
children in failed schools, not as an endorsement of religious schooling
in general.”87 The Supreme Court’s use of the reasonable observer
standard in deciding Establishment Clause cases has been mirrored by
the federal courts.
C. The Reasonable Observer Standard Applied by the Circuits
Soon after Lynch, the federal circuits began applying the
Endorsement Test to Establishment Clause challenges.88 The circuits that
have applied the Endorsement Test to alleged Establishment Clause
violations, either as a separate test or as the effects prong of the Lemon
Test, have adopted Justice O’Connor’s definition of the reasonable
observer.89
“invocation[]” should be given; in the second election, students would vote on a student
speaker. Id. at 297-98. In the first election, the students voted to allow an invocation; and
in the second election, the students chose a student speaker. Id. The Court did not discuss
what the objective Santa Fe High School student would know about the policy and
elections for the student led prayer; however, both Justice O’Connor and Justice Stevens
agreed that an objective student would receive a message of endorsement. Id. at 292.
86
536 U.S. 639 (2002).
87
Id. at 655. Ohio initiated the Pilot Project Scholarship Program to provide financial
assistance to families in any school district that had failed to meet certain requirements. Id.
at 644-45. The scholarship program provided parents with tuition aid if they elected to
choose to send their children to any of the participating private schools and it provided
extra money to public, community, and magnet schools when parents elected to send their
children to those schools. Id. at 646-48.
88
In 1985, a year after the Lynch decision, the Tenth Circuit applied the Endorsement
Test in a challenge to a county seal. Friedman v. Bd. of County Comm’rs, 781 F.2d 777
(10th Cir. 1985). In Friedman, the plaintiffs challenged a New Mexico county seal inscribed
with a Latin Cross and the phrase “Con Esta Vencemos,” meaning “With this We
Conquer.” Id. at 779. The court stated the inquiry into the effects prong of the Lemon Test
as “the existence of a non-secular effect is to be judged by an objective standard, which
looks only to the reaction of the average receiver of the government communication or
average observer of the government action.” Id. at 781. In determining the effect on an
average observer, the court heard the testimony of a county commissioner who stated that
the cross represented the role of the Catholic Church in settling the southwest. Id. at 779.
Two historians and an expert in heraldry also testified that the cross on the seal represented
Catholicism, Christianity, and the Spaniards, and that religious conversion in the
southwest was often done by force. Id. The court then held that the seal conveyed a
message of endorsement because it recalled a less tolerant time and forecasted its return.
Id. at 782.
89
See infra notes 90-94 and accompanying text. In 1997, the Third Circuit attempted to
adopt Justice Stevens’ definition of the reasonable observer. ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d
1435, 1447-48 (3d Cir. 1997). In Schundler, for thirty years Jersey City had displayed a
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The federal circuits generally have not been afraid to impute the
reasonable observer with knowledge that cannot be gathered from
observing the display.90 A reasonable observer in the Second Circuit
does not wear blinders and is not focused solely on the religious
display.91 A reasonable observer in the Third Circuit has been imputed
with knowledge of items that are of religious significance to Orthodox
Jews and with the knowledge of how a city enforces its ordinances.92
crèche during the Christmas season and a menorah during the nine days of Hanukkah on
the city hall lawn. Id. at 1438. Jersey City argued that a “reasonable, informed observer”
would know of Jersey City’s many celebrations of different cultures and religions. Id. at
1447. The Third Circuit rejected this argument. Id. at 1449. The court reasoned that an
observer who was new to Jersey City and who had no knowledge of Jersey City’s history
should not be deemed less reasonable, or provided with less constitutional protection, than
a Christian or a Jew who had lived in Jersey City for twenty years. Id. at 1448-49.
Jersey City, after the initial complaint had been filed, modified the display and erected
figures of Santa Claus and Frosty the Snowman and a red wooden sled alongside the
crèche. Id. at 1439. In a subsequent suit, the Third Circuit declared this modified display
constitutional. ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92, 95 (3d Cir. 1999). The Third Circuit held
that when analyzing the message conveyed to a reasonable observer, Jersey City’s tradition
of erecting displays and hosting celebrations for various cultures and religions should be
considered. Id. at 106.
For a critique of the court’s holding, see Gabriel Acri, American Civil Liberties Union
of New Jersey v. Schundler: Established Endorsement in Need of “Supreme” Intervention, 40
CATH. LAW. 165 (2000). Acri argued that making a reasonable observer aware of the
history and ubiquity of a religious display would make changing a religious display
impossible. Id. at 189. A reasonable observer, knowing the history of an unconstitutional
display, would suppose that the message remained the same and that the secular objects
were added only to make the display constitutional. Id.
The Sixth Circuit demonstrated the difference between the knowledge of an ordinary
observer and an informed observer. See ACLU v. Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd.,
243 F.3d 289, 302-03 (6th Cir. 2001). In declaring Ohio’s state motto, “With God, All Things
are Possible,” constitutional, the court imputed the reasonable observer with knowledge of
forty-year old press releases, the text of the New Testament, and philosophical knowledge
that contributed to the heritage of Ohio. Id. The court imputed this knowledge to the
reasonable observer despite concluding that an average Ohio citizen would have no
knowledge of the forty-year old press releases or have the vaguest notion of how the motto
was chosen. Id.
90
See infra notes 91-94 and accompanying text.
91
Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51, 54 (2d Cir. 1997). In Elewski, the City of
Syracuse had erected a crèche on a street corner. Id. at 52. The city had also decorated
lampposts around the city with greenery, wreaths, and colored lights, and decorated a park
with bells, a snowman, and reindeer. Id. The court upheld the display of the crèche. Id. at
54-55. Because the reasonable observer is not focused solely on the crèche, the court
reasoned that an observer would have remembered seeing the other decorations
throughout the city and would have concluded that the city was not endorsing religion. Id.
In addition, the court stated the reasonable observer would have known that the
downtown merchants supported the display to encourage Christmas shopping. Id. at 55.
92
Tenafly Eruv Ass’n v. Borough of Tenafly, 309 F.3d 144, 176 (3d Cir. 2002). In Tenafly,
an ordinance prohibited any person to place a sign or advertisement on any telephone pole
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Courts in the Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits have imputed
reasonable observers with knowledge of the land where the display is
located.93 In the Sixth and Ninth Circuits, the reasonable observers are
deemed aware of the purposes behind a city erecting a monument with
religious overtones.94

without the consent of the borough. Id. at 151. However, the borough did not strictly
enforce the ordinance. Id. The plaintiffs, Orthodox Jews, approached the borough about
erecting an eruv. Id. at 152. An eruv is created by placing lechis vertically along utility
poles. Id. The court allowed the plaintiffs to create an eruv because a reasonable observer
would know that lechis are items of significance to Orthodox Jews, that lechis enable
Orthodox Jews to engage in activities that are normally prohibited, and that lechis were
allowed on the utility poles only because of the borough’s selective application of the
ordinance. Id. at 176.
An eruv is a ceremonial demarcation of an area, and its boundaries are designated by
overhead utility lines and lechis. Id. at 152. Orthodox Jews are prohibited by their faith
from pushing or carrying any objects outside of their homes on the Sabbath or on Yom
Kippur. Id. However, Orthodox Jews permit themselves to do these activities on the
Sabbath within an eruv. Id. An eruv extends the boundary of the home, permitting
Orthodox Jews to push strollers and wheelchairs between their home and synagogue. Id.
For a more detailed explanation of an eruv, see Shira J. Schlaff, Comment, Using an Eruv to
Untangle the Boundaries of the Supreme Court’s Religion-Clause Jurisprudence, 5 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 831 (2003).
93
Ams. United for Separation of Church & State v. City of Grand Rapids, 980 F.2d 1538,
1549 (6th Cir. 1992); Kreisner v. City of San Diego, 1 F.3d 775, 784 (9th Cir. 1993) (upholding
a Christmas display in a public park because “the reasonable observer is aware of Balboa
Park’s public forum nature and City’s first-come, first-served permit policy. Our observer
realizes that the Park . . . host[s] an eclectic range of uses throughout the year”); ChabadLubavitch v. Miller, 5 F.3d 1383, 1390 n.11 (11th Cir. 1993) (holding that a menorah placed
on the rotunda of the State Capital was constitutional because a reasonable observer
“would view the menorah display fully aware that the Rotunda is a public forum in which
a multiplicity of groups, both secular and religious, have sponsored displays”).
In Americans United for Separation of Church & State, Grand Rapids permitted the
Chabad House to erect a twenty-foot menorah in Calder Plaza, a public park in the center
of Grand Rapids that had previously been used for rallies, Hunger Walks, festivals, and
sports exhibitions. 980 F.2d at 1539-40. In declaring the menorah constitutional, the Sixth
Circuit stated, “To a reasonable observer, no display actually stands alone in this public
forum. In the mind’s eye, the reasonable observer sees the menorah display as but one of a
long series that has taken place since the Plaza was opened.” Id. at 1549. In rejecting the
passerby as the standard reasonable observer, the court noted that the reasonable observer
follows local politics and reads the newspapers. Id. at 1550. The dissent in Americans
United for Separation of Church & State argued that Justice Stevens’ definition of the
reasonable observer should be adopted and stated that the reasonable observer should not
have to be familiar with the religious demographics of Grand Rapids, the city’s regulations
concerning the use of Calder Plaza, or the past uses of Calder Plaza. Id. at 1558.
94
Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000); Alvarado v. City of San Jose,
94 F.3d 1223 (9th Cir. 1996).
In Brooks, the City of Oak Ridge commissioned the making of the “Friendship Bell” to
commemorate its fiftieth anniversary. 222 F.3d at 262. Oak Ridge was established in 1942
after President Theodore Roosevelt designated the land where it sits as the “Manhattan
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Fueled by a desire to provide a test capable of consistent application
in analyzing challenges to the Establishment Clause, Justice O’Connor
introduced the Endorsement Test in her concurring opinion in Lynch.95
Although a majority of the Supreme Court implicitly adopted the
Endorsement Test five years later in Allegheny,96 the Court has not been
able to agree on what knowledge should be imputed to the reasonable
observer.97 The Supreme Court’s failure to define the knowledge of a
reasonable observer has resulted in courts using a variety of reasonable
observers as they have struggled to determine the constitutionality of
public Ten Commandments displays.
III. THE TEN COMMANDMENTS AND THE COURTS
In analyzing public Ten Commandments displays, lower courts have
employed the Endorsement Test, but have not always reached consistent
holdings on what knowledge should be imputed to the reasonable
observer.98 Part III of this Note will explore how courts have handled
public displays of the Ten Commandments. Part III.A will discuss the

Project,” the site where the two atomic bombs that were dropped on Japan were built. Id.
at 263 n.1. The purpose of the Friendship Bell was to commemorate Oak Ridge’s
connection with Japan and its desire for international peace and friendship. Id. at 266. The
Friendship Bell bared a strong resemblance to bells found in Buddhist temples. Id. at 262.
The Friendship Bell was also cast in a traditional ceremony in Japan. Id. at 263. The Sixth
Circuit held that the reasonable observer would not conclude that Oak Ridge was
endorsing Buddhism because the reasonable observer would have knowledge of the bell
casting ceremony, the bell’s adoption as a display of the city’s fiftieth anniversary, and the
city’s statement that the bell was to commemorate Oak Ridge’s connection with Japan. Id.
at 266. The court also assumed that the reasonable observer would not be swayed by any
newspaper articles that tried to impute quasi-religious qualities to the bell. Id.
In Alvarado, the City of San Jose commissioned a sculpture of Quazalcoatl to
commemorate the Mexican and Spanish contributions to the culture of San Jose. 94 F.3d at
1225. Quazalcoatl, a Mesoamerican creator-deity, was worshipped by the Aztec and
Mayan civilizations until they were conquered by the Spanish in the sixteenth century. Id.
at 1226. After the Spanish conquest, the religion of the Aztecs and Mayans died. Id. San
Jose argued that because the worship of Quazalcoatl had ceased approximately five
hundred years earlier that Quazalcoatl was no longer a religious figure. Id. at 1227.
However, the plaintiffs argued that Quazalcoatl was a religious figure because worship of
him was re-emerging with the Zapastistas, revolutionaries in southern Mexico. Id. at 1231.
The Ninth Circuit held that the sculpture of Quazalcoatl would not convey a message of
endorsement because a reasonable observer would be aware that the sculpture represented
an ancient deity. Id. at 1232. The court also stated that the reasonable observer would not
be an expert on religions practiced by revolutionary groups in Mexico. Id.
95
See supra notes 41-48 and accompanying text.
96
See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
97
See supra text accompanying notes 71-81.
98
See infra notes 168-70 and accompanying text.
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Supreme Court’s limited treatment of the Ten Commandments.99 Part
III.B will note various secular purposes courts have found for displaying
the Ten Commandments.100 Part III.C will explore how courts have
analyzed public displays of the Ten Commandments using the
reasonable observer standard.101
A. The Supreme Court and the Ten Commandments
The Supreme Court has provided minimal guidance on the
constitutionality of public displays of the Ten Commandments.102 In
Stone v. Graham,103 the Court struck down a Kentucky statute that
required a copy of the Ten Commandments to be posted in all public
school classrooms.104 In striking down the statute, the Court emphasized
that the Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred text.105 However,
the Court did not rule out the possibility that a Ten Commandments
display might be constitutional; the Court stated, “This is not a case in
which the Ten Commandments are integrated into the school
curriculum, where the Bible may constitutionally be used in an
appropriate study of history, civilization, ethics, comparative religion, or
the like.”106
B. Secular Purposes for Posting the Ten Commandments
The Ten Commandments, located in the Old Testament at Exodus
20:2-17 and Deuteronomy 5:6-21, is a sacred religious text to Protestants,
Catholics, and Jews.107 Like the Court in Stone, lower courts have not
See infra Part III.A.
See infra Part III.B.
101
See infra Part III.C.
102
The Supreme Court has only ruled on one case involving the Ten Commandments,
Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39 (1980). See infra text accompanying notes 103-06.
103
449 U.S. 39 (1980).
104
Id. at 41.
105
Id. Specifically, the Court stated, “The Ten Commandments are undeniably a sacred
text in the Jewish and Christian faiths, and no legislative recitation of a supposed secular
purpose can blind us to that fact.” Id. The Court rejected Kentucky’s legislative purpose of
displaying the Ten Commandments as a fundamental legal code. Id. The Court noted that
the Ten Commandments are not limited to secular matters such as honoring parents,
killing, adultery, stealing, lying, or coveting, but include religious duties of believers of
worshipping God, not bowing down to idols, not taking the Lord’s name in vain, and
observing the Sabbath. Id. at 41-42.
106
Id. at 42.
107
Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 296 (7th Cir. 2000). Although all three religions
adhere to the Ten Commandments, the three religions disagree on the numbering of the
Ten Commandments. Protestant churches number the Ten Commandments in the
following manner:
99

100
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1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.

You shall have no other gods before me.
You shall not make for yourself an idol.
You shall not misuse the name of the LORD your God.
Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy.
Honor your father and your mother.
You shall not murder.
You shall not commit adultery.
You shall not steal.
You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor.
You shall not covet.
THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM, Question & Answer 92, reprinted in PSALTER HYMNAL 903-04
(1987).
The Lutheran and Roman Catholic Churches combine the first two commandments
and divide the commandment on coveting into two commandments. 2 FRED H. KLOOSTER,
OUR ONLY COMFORT: A COMPREHENSIVE COMMENTARY ON THE HEIDELBERG CATECHISM 925
(2001). The Ten Commandments for Lutherans and Catholics are numbered as follows:
1.
You shall worship the LORD your God and serve Him only.
2.
You shall not take the name of the LORD your God in vain.
3.
Remember the Sabbath day by keeping it holy.
4.
Honor your father and your mother.
5.
You shall not murder.
6.
You shall not commit adultery.
7.
You shall not steal.
8.
You shall not give false testimony against your neighbor.
9.
You shall not covet your neighbor’s wife.
10. You shall not covet your neighbor’s goods.
LUTHER’S CATECHISM: THE SMALL CATECHISM OF DR. MARTIN LUTHER AND AN EXPOSITION
FOR CHILDREN AND ADULTS WRITTEN IN CONTEMPORARY ENGLISH 53-123 (1982); UNITED
STATES CATHOLIC CONFERENCE, INC., CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC FAITH 561-672 (1995).
As their first commandment, Jews use a declaration of faith, and then combine the
first two commandments for Protestants into one commandment. ALAN. M. DERSHOWITZ,
THE GENESIS OF JUSTICE: TEN STORIES OF BIBLICAL INJUSTICE THAT LED TO THE TEN
COMMANDMENTS AND MODERN LAW 247-48 (2000). The Ten Commandments for Jews are
numbered as follows:
1.
I am the LORD your God.
2.
You shall have no other gods before me.
3.
You shall not swear.
4.
You shall honor the Sabbath.
5.
You shall honor your father and your mother.
6.
You shall not kill.
7.
You shall not commit adultery.
8.
You shall not steal.
9.
You shall not give false testimony.
10. You shall not covet.
11. You shall not swear.
12. You shall honor the Sabbath.
Id. at 247-52.
In lawsuits attacking public Ten Commandments displays, plaintiffs often argue that
government is endorsing a religion because government has displayed the text of the Ten
Commandments as adhered to by one religion. See, e.g., ACLU Claims Opposition to Ten
Commandments Display Over Concern for Catholics: Catholic Group Rejects ACLU “Defense,”
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been quick to overlook that the Ten Commandments are primarily a
religious text.108 However, no court has been willing to say that posting
the Ten Commandments cannot serve a secular purpose.109 Justice
Stevens in Allegheny even provided a constitutional context in which the
Ten Commandments could be publicly displayed.110 He stated that no
message is more fitting for a courtroom than a display of Moses carrying
the Ten Commandments, Mohammad, Confucius, Blackstone, Napoleon,
and John Marshall.111 The Eleventh Circuit, in spring of 2003, found a
LIFESITE DAILY NEWS, Jan. 9, 2004, at http://www.lifesite.net/ldn/2004/jan/04010907.html
(last visited Aug. 4, 2004) (reporting that the ACLU is arguing that the Iowa government
favored Christians over Jews, Catholics, and Lutherans because the Ten Commandments
displayed in the Iowa Statehouse quotes the Ten Commandments from the King James
Version). This argument has been rejected by one court. See ACLU v. Mercer County, 219
F. Supp. 2d 777, 797 (E.D. Ky. 2002) (“The mere fact that the posted version may be more
like a traditional Protestant version than the Catholic or Jewish versions does not mean that
the posting of the Commandments favors one denomination or one religion over
another.”).
108
See Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 262 (3d Cir. 2003) (“As a
preliminary matter, we cannot ignore the inherently religious message of the Ten
Commandments.”); Books, 235 F.3d at 302 (“[W]e do not think it can be said that the Ten
Commandments, standing by themselves, can be stripped of their religious, indeed sacred,
significance and characterized as a moral or ethical document.”).
109
See Freethought Soc’y, 334 F.3d at 262 (“[W]e do not believe that Stone holds that there
can never be a secular purpose for posting the Ten Commandments, or that the Ten
Commandments are so overwhelmingly religious in nature that they will always be seen
only as an endorsement of religion.”); Books, 235 F.3d at 302 (“The text of the Ten
Commandments no doubt has played a role in the secular development of our society and
can no doubt be presented by the government as playing such a role in our civic order.”);
Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 33 (10th Cir. 1973) (quoting one of plaintiff’s
attorneys as saying, “[T]he Ten Commandments is an affirmation of at least a precedent
legal code”). But see Joseph R. Duncan, Jr., Privilege, Invisibility and Religion: A Critique of
the Privilege That Christianity Has Enjoyed in the United States, 54 ALA. L. REV. 617 (2003)
(arguing that allowing the Ten Commandments to be posted in public offices under the
assumption of it being a secular, historical document is an example of the privilege
Christians have enjoyed since the foundation of the United States).
110
County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 652 (1989).
111
Id. Justice Stevens commented that a display of this kind signaled respect for great
lawgivers. Id. at 652-53. Justice Stevens was referring to the frieze on the north and south
walls of the Supreme Court courtroom. The frieze was designed in 1931–1932 and includes
a procession of “great lawgivers of history.” OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF
THE UNITED STATES, COURTROOM FRIEZES:
NORTH AND SOUTH WALLS (2002),
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/north&southwalls.pdf (last visited Aug. 19,
2004). The procession includes Menes, Hammurabi, Moses, Solomon, Lycurgus, Solon,
Draco, Confucius, Octavian, Justinian, Muhammad, Charlemagne, King John, Louis IX,
Hugo Grotius, Sir William Blackstone, John Marshall, and Napoleon. Id. Moses in the
frieze is holding two tablets, on which appear commandments six through ten in Hebrew.
Id.
Moses also appears in the Supreme Court building on the East Pediment. OFFICE OF
THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, THE EAST PEDIMENT (2002),
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constitutional use of the Ten Commandments in King v. Richmond
County.112 Since 1872, the Superior Court of Richmond County, Georgia,
had used as its seal a circle inscribed with two rectangular tablets with
rounded tops.113 The court held that the county had articulated a secular
purpose when it argued that the seal was adopted because the Ten
Commandments were recognizable symbols of the law for its illiterate
citizens.114
C. The Circuits and the Ten Commandments
In the past five years, the federal courts have experienced a dramatic
increase in cases involving public Ten Commandments displays.115
Because the Supreme Court has provided little guidance on Ten
Commandments displays,116 the decisions by lower federal courts are
often hard to reconcile as the courts have employed different reasonable
observers. The use of different reasonable observers is most visible by
comparing the two decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit and the
Seventh Circuit regarding Fraternal Order of Eagles’ (“FOE”)

http://www.supremecourtus.gov/about/eastpediment.pdf (last visited Aug. 19, 2004).
On the east pediment, Moses is surrounded by Confucius and Solon and is holding two
tablets. Id. In addition to the portrayals of Moses, tablets inscribed with the Roman
numerals I-X are depicted in three locations in the Supreme Court building: the support
frame for the bronze gates; the interior panels of the Courtroom doors; and in the
woodwork of the library. OFFICE OF THE CURATOR, SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES,
SYMBOLS OF LAW (2002), http://www.supremecourt.gov/about/symbolsoflaw.pdf (last
visited Aug. 19, 2004).
The Senate office buildings contain no images of the Ten Commandments or of Moses.
E-mail from Scott Strong, Office of Senate Curator, to Julie Van Groningen, Law Student,
Valparaiso University School of Law (Oct. 20, 2003, 13:14:38) (on file with author). The
chamber of the House of Representatives contains a full-face bas relief of Moses. THE
ARCHITECT OF THE CAPITAL, RELIEF PORTRAITS OF LAWGIVERS (1993), available at
http://www.aoc.gov/cc/art/lawgivers/lawgivers.htm (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). In
addition to the plaque of Moses, the chambers of the House of Representatives also contain
plaques of George Mason, Robert Joseph Potheir, Jean Baptiste Colbert, Edward I, Alfonso
X, Gregory IX, Saint Louis, Justinian I, Tribonian, Lycurgus, Hammurabi, Solon, Papinian,
Gaius, Suleiman, Innocent III, Simon de Montfort, Hugo Grotius, Sir William Blackstone,
Napoleon, and Thomas Jefferson. Id. The plaque of Moses is hung over the gallery doors
and the profiles of the other twenty-two men face Moses. Id.
112
331 F.3d 1271 (11th Cir. 2003).
113
Id. at 1274. Around the seal’s perimeter were the words “SUPERIOR COURT
RICHMOND COUNTY.” Id. In the middle of the seal was a depiction of a hilt and the tip
of a sword. Id. On the center of the hilt and sword were the two tablets. Id. The tablets
contained the roman numerals I-X, but not the text of the Ten Commandments. Id.
114
Id. at 1277-78.
115
See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
116
See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
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monuments.117 The different reasonable observers are then exemplified
by looking at the two Ten Commandments cases from the summer of
2003 and the cases regarding modified displays.118
1.

The Cases Involving Fraternal Order of Eagles’ Monuments

The use of different reasonable observers is seen by comparing the
two decisions rendered by the Fifth Circuit and the Seventh Circuit
regarding FOE monuments.119 In Books v. City of Elkhart,120 the plaintiffs
See infra notes 119-30 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 131-63 and accompanying text.
119
See Van Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d
292 (7th Cir. 2000). See infra notes 133-43 and accompanying text for a discussion on the
reasonable observer employed by the two circuits. Although the holdings are difficult to
reconcile based on the courts’ analysis of the reasonable observer, the holdings are
reconcilable on the purpose prong. The Seventh Circuit held that the City of Elkhart did
not have a secular purpose in displaying the monument, because it concluded that the city
had wanted to impress a religious code of conduct on its citizens and because the city had
elected to have a Protestant minister, a Catholic priest, and a Jewish rabbi speak at the
dedication of the monument. Books, 235 F.3d at 303. The Fifth Circuit held that the state of
Texas had a secular purpose—recognizing the FOE’s efforts in reducing juvenile
delinquency—in accepting and erecting the statute. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 179.
The FOE donated more than four thousand Ten Commandments monuments
throughout the 1950s, ‘60s, and ‘70s to state and local governments. Jacoby, supra note 12.
In 1943, a Minnesota juvenile court judge, an FOE member, decided that he wanted to
provide American youth with a code of conduct. State v. Freedom from Religion Found.,
898 P.2d 1013, 1017 (Colo. 1995). His original plan was to place copies of the Ten
Commandments in state juvenile courts, and he brought this idea to his local FOE aerie for
financial support. Id. At first, his aerie denied financial support because they believed the
Ten Commandments might be perceived as coercive or sectarian. Id. However, after
Jewish, Protestant, and Catholic representatives agreed on a non-sectarian version of the
Ten Commandments, the FOE agreed to finance this project. Id. During the same period,
Cecil B. DeMille was producing the movie “The Ten Commandments” and he called up the
judge and suggested distributing the copies of the Ten Commandments to coincide with
the release of his movie. Id. DeMille and the judge then agreed that because the original
Ten Commandments were on granite, that the donated copies would also be on granite. Id.
Local FOE aeries, after paying for the manufacture of the monuments, donated them to
their local governments. Id.
The FOE monuments are six feet high and three and a half feet wide. Van Orden, 351
F.3d at 176. The face of the monument is consumed with the text of the non-sectarian Ten
Commandments. Id. Above the text are two small tablets containing ancient Hebrew
script, and located between the tablets is an all-seeing eye within a pyramid. Id. Below the
pyramid is an American eagle holding an American flag. Id. Beneath the text are two Stars
of David and the Greek letters, Chi and Rho, superimposed upon each other, a symbol of
Christ. Id. The monuments also contained plaques stating that they had been donated by
the FOE. Id. For a picture of an FOE monument, see Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292,
309 (7th Cir. 2000).
In 2002, the Tenth Circuit heard a challenge to a 1966 FOE Ten Commandments
monument donated to the City of Ogden, Utah. Summan v. City of Ogden, 297 F.3d 995
117
118
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challenged the constitutionality of a 1958 FOE-donated Ten
Commandments monument that sat on the front lawn of Elkhart’s
municipal building.121 The Seventh Circuit held that the monument
conveyed a message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.122 The
(10th Cir. 2002). Because of a prior decision in 1973, the court was forced to take a different
route other than declaring the monument constitutional or unconstitutional. Id. In 1973,
the Tenth Circuit had declared an FOE monument constitutional because it was a passive
display that depicted a historically important document that had secular effects. Anderson
v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29, 33-34 (10th Cir. 1973). In 2002, adherents of the
Summan religion petitioned Ogden to place a monument with its Seven Principles next to
the FOE monument. Summan, 297 F.3d at 998. Upon appeal from the district court’s grant
of summary judgment for Ogden, the Tenth Circuit, in 2002, stated it could not overrule
Anderson and declare an FOE monument unconstitutional absent an en banc hearing. Id. at
999-1000. Instead, the Tenth Circuit decided the case based on the Free Exercise Clause and
held that Ogden had established a non-public forum when it accepted the FOE monument.
Id. at 1002. In addition, the court held that Ogden had engaged in unconstitutional
viewpoint discrimination when it refused to accept the Summan monument. Id. at 1011.
This decision held grave implications for the City of Casper, Wyoming. See Wyoming
City Council Moves Ten Commandments, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Oct. 29, 2003,
http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,101546,00.html (last visited Aug. 4, 2004).
Because an FOE monument stood in a public park, the Rev. Phelps petitioned Casper to
allow him to place a monument stating that Matthew Shepard, a young, gay man
murdered in 1998, went to hell because of his sexual orientation. Id. Rev. Phelps
threatened to sue Casper, based on Summan, if it refused to permit his monument in the
park. Id. As a result, Casper, to avoid litigation, moved the FOE monument to a plaza
honoring historical documents. Id.
120
235 F.3d 292.
121
Id. at 295. Also located on the twenty-five foot lawn were a Revolutionary War
Monument and a Freedom Monument. Id. The Ten Commandments monument and the
Revolutionary War Monument were located approximately the same distance from the
entrance of the municipal building and from the sidewalk. Id. at 296 n.3. The city did not
provide any maintenance to any of the three monuments. Id. at 295.
122
Id. at 307. In the Supreme Court’s denial of certiorari, Chief Justice Rehnquist, joined
by Justices Scalia and Thomas, wrote a dissenting opinion. City of Elkhart v. Books, 532
U.S. 1058, 1059 (2001). The Chief Justice disagreed with the Seventh Circuit’s opinion and
stated that the primary effect of the monument was not to endorse religion. Id. at 1062-63.
He reasoned that because the monument was located on the front lawn of the Municipal
Building that the secular significance of the Ten Commandments in establishing American
law was emphasized. Id. He further reasoned that the secular significance was
emphasized because the two other monuments celebrated the city’s history. Id.
Compare Books, 235 F.3d at 292, with Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1013. In
Freedom from Religion Foundation, an FOE monument was placed in Lincoln Park, a stateowned park across the street from the Colorado State Capital Building. 898 P.2d at 1015.
Lincoln Park and the State Capital Building were both located in a three-block area called
the Capital Complex Grounds. Id. At least fifteen other monuments were located
throughout the Capital Grounds, and the closest monument to the FOE monument was
over thirty-feet away. Id. at 1015-16. The court held that a reasonable observer would not
see the FOE monument as an endorsement of religion because the monument did not stand
alone in Lincoln Park, rather, it was in the vicinity of larger monuments. Id. at 1025. The
court further reasoned that the FOE monument did not endorse religion because the other
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court reasoned that any passerby or any individual approaching the
municipal building would not view the FOE monument along with the
other two monuments on the lawn as being a comprehensive display of
the cultural heritage of Elkhart.123 The court reached this holding
because the monument was located on the lawn at the seat of the city
government, and because the format of the display did nothing to dilute
its religious message.124
Unlike the reasonable observer in Books, who only has knowledge
about what he or she can see, the reasonable observer in Van Orden v.
Perry125 is informed and is able to form conclusions using information
not gleaned from looking at the monument.126 In Van Orden, the plaintiff
challenged a 1961 FOE-donated Ten Commandments monument located
on the State Capital Grounds in Texas.127 The court concluded that a
reasonable observer would not perceive endorsement because a
reasonable observer would be aware that sixteen other monuments were
located on the Capital Grounds and that all the monuments described
the Texan identity.128 The court also noted that the reasonable observer
monuments in Lincoln Park also commemorated the history of the United States and
Colorado. Id. Furthermore, the court reasoned that the display did not have a coercive
effect on any viewer because it was located in an inconspicuous place where persons
would only go by choice. Id.
123
Books, 235 F.3d at 306. The court focused on what a passerby would see even though it
had previously stated that the reasonable observer is one “familiar with the history and
placement of the Ten Commandments monument.” Id.
124
Id. The court reasoned that even though the monument contained symbols of Judaism
and Christianity the monument violated the Establishment Clause because Judaism and
Christianity were not the only religions in Elkhart. Id. The court also reasoned that
because the monument showed the American eagle gripping the flag, that the monument
unconstitutionally linked government with Judaism and Christianity. Id. at 307. Contra
Freedom from Religion Found., 898 P.2d at 1023 (reasoning that the integration of the Star of
David and the symbol of Christ acknowledged diversity and reconciliation between
Judaism and Christianity, not intolerance of other religions).
125
351 F.3d 173 (5th Cir. 2003).
126
See id. at 178. The court stated, “This is the observation of a reasonable observer, not
of the uninformed, the casual passerby, the heckler, or the reaction of a single individual.”
Id. at 177-78.
127
Id. at 175-76. The State Capital Grounds in Texas consisted of twenty-two acres, on
which sits seventeen monuments. Id. at 175. The other sixteen monuments included a
memorial to Texas children, a tribute to Texas women, a memorial to Pearl Harbor
veterans, a replica of the Statute of Liberty, a memorial to Korean War veterans, a memorial
to the World War I veterans, Van Orden v. Perry, No. A-01-CA-833-H, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 26709, at *5 n.5 (W.D. Tex. Oct. 2, 2002), aff’d, 351 F.3d 113 (5th Cir. 2003), and a
memorial to the Alamo soldiers. Van Orden, 351 F.3d at 175. The State Capital Grounds
had previously been designated as a national Historic Landmark that was dedicated to
displaying monuments showcasing the Texan identity. Id.
128
Id. at 182.
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would know that the monument had stood for forty-two years without
being challenged.129 In addition, the court stated that a reasonable
observer would know that the monument was located directly between
the legislative chambers, the office of the governor, and the Supreme
Court Building, and would know that the Ten Commandments have
influenced law-making bodies.130
2.

The Two Cases from Summer 2003

During the summer of 2003, the Third Circuit and the Eleventh
Circuit handed down opinions regarding the constitutionality of Ten
Commandments displays located at courthouses.131 Although the Third
Circuit declared the display constitutional and the Eleventh Circuit
declared the display unconstitutional, the two holdings are consistent as
each court imputed substantial knowledge to the reasonable observer.132
In Freethought Society v. Chester County,133 the Third Circuit held that
a Ten Commandments plaque, which had been affixed to the façade of
the Chester County courthouse for the past eighty years, did not violate
the Establishment Clause.134 In holding that a reasonable observer
129
Id. at 181-82. The court noted the age of the monument lessened the inference to a
reasonable observer that the state acted with an improper purpose. Id. at 182.
130
Id. at 181. In concluding, the court stated:
[W]e disserve no constitutional principle by concluding that a State’s
display of the decalogue in a manner that honors its secular strength is
not inevitably an impermissible endorsement of its religious message
in the eyes of our reasonable observer. To say otherwise retreats from
the objective test of an informed person to the heckler’s veto of the
unreasonable or ill-informed—replacing the sense of proportion and fit
with uncompromising rigidity at a costly price to the values of the First
Amendment.
Id. at 182.
131
See Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3309
(U.S. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03-468); Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir.
2003).
132
See Gary Young, Thou Shalt, and Thou Shalt Not: Two Courts Give Two Very Different
Rulings on Ten Commandments Displays, 25 NAT’L L.J. 7 (July 14, 2003). Young quoted
Professor Douglas Laycock who stated that he was “absolutely certain” that the Third
Circuit would have ruled the same way as the Eleventh Circuit had it had been presented
with the same set of facts. Id.
133
334 F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003).
134
Id. at 250-51. The plaque, donated to the courthouse in 1920 by the Religious
Education Council, was affixed to the facade next to the main entrance. Id. at 249-50.
However, that entrance was closed a few years before the lawsuit and since then visitors
have entered the courthouse seventy feet to the north. Id. Since receiving the plaque, the
county did nothing to maintain its appearance. Id. at 250. The suit was brought by a
Chester County resident who had noticed the plaque in 1960 but who was not bothered by
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would not conclude that the county was endorsing religion, the court
assumed that the reasonable observer would be informed about the
approximate age of the plaque, would know that the county provided no
maintenance to the plaque, and would be informed about the general
history of the county.135 Armed with this knowledge, the reasonable
observer, the court concluded, would view the plaque as part of the
history of Chester County.136
In the second Ten Commandments case decided in the summer of
2003, the Eleventh Circuit, in Glassroth v. Moore,137 declared a two and
one-half ton monument bearing the Ten Commandments, which had
been placed in the rotunda of the Alabama State Judicial Building by
Judge Roy Moore, unconstitutional.138 The court held the monument
conveyed a message of endorsement to the reasonable observer.139 The
it until 2001. Id. Freethought Society, “a forum for atheists, agnostics, freethinkers to meet,
socialize and exchange ideas,” brought the suit on the citizen’s behalf. Id.
The court used the Lemon Test to analyze the plaque’s constitutionality and used the
Endorsement Test to analyze the effects prong. Id. at 261-69. In determining the purpose of
the plaque, the court looked at the purpose of the county commissioners who refused to
take down the plaque in 2001 and not at the purpose of the government in accepting the
plaque in 1920. Id. at 267. The court held that the commissioners had a legitimate secular
purpose in keeping the plaque on the façade because the commissioners believed the
plaque symbolized how faith and reason worked together in creating the United States. Id.
In using the Endorsement Test, the court expressly adopted Justice O’Connor’s
reasonable observer. Id. at 259. The court stated, “[A] reasonable observer must be
presumed to have an understanding of the general history of the display and the
community in which it is displayed; the reasonable observer is more knowledgeable than
the uninformed passerby.” Id.
135
Id. at 260. Although the court did not impute the reasonable observer with knowledge
of the exact age of the plaque, but only with knowledge that the plaque had been affixed to
the courthouse for a long time, the reasonable observer used this knowledge in
determining the purpose of the plaque. Id. at 265. The court stated:
The reasonable observer would perceive an historic plaque as less of
an endorsement of religion than a more recent religious display not
because the Ten Commandments have lost their religious significance,
but because the maintenance of this plaque sends a much different
message about the religious views of the County . . . . The reasonable
observer, knowing the age of the . . . plaque, would regard the decision
to leave it in place as motivated, in significant part, by the desire to
preserve a longstanding plaque.
Id.
136
Id.
137
335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03468).
138
Id. at 1284.
139
Id. at 1297. In its analysis, the court applied the Lemon Test, and it found that no
secular purpose existed for displaying the Ten Commandments monument because Judge
Moore repeatedly said his purpose in displaying the monument was to “acknowledge the
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reasonable observer, the court noted, would know that Judge Moore had
campaigned under the slogan “Ten Commandments Judge,” that Judge
Moore had placed the monument in the rotunda to keep his campaign
promise of restoring the moral foundation of the law, and that the
rotunda was not a public forum where other groups could place
displays.140
3.

The Modified Displays

In addition to the holdings in Glassroth and Books,141 the majority of
public Ten Commandments displays have been declared
unconstitutional.142
Because of this, local government officials,
attempting to comply with the Supreme Court’s holdings in Lynch and
Allegheny,143 have put the Ten Commandments in a setting that attempts
to negate their religious nature.144 This effort has not always saved FOE
law and sovereignty of the God of the Holy Scriptures, and that it was intended to
acknowledge ‘God’s overruling power over the affairs of men.’” Id. at 1296.
140
Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1282
(11th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 72 U.S.L.W. 3309 (No. 03-468). The court limited the reasonable
observer’s knowledge by stating that the reasonable observer would not know about Judge
Moore’s relationship with Coral Ridge Ministries, his numerous speeches, or his television
and radio appearances over the past two years. Id.
141
See supra notes 120-24, 137-40 and accompanying text.
142
See ACLU v. Ashbrook, 375 F.3d 484 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that a poster displaying
the Ten Commandments in a courtroom was unconstitutional); Mercier v. City of La
Crosse, 305 F. Supp. 2d 999 (W.D. Wis. 2004) (holding an FOE monument located in a city
park most likely created the perception of endorsement); ACLU v. Hamilton County, 202 F.
Supp. 2d 757 (E.D. Tenn. 2002) (declaring a plaque of the Ten Commandments hanging
alone in a courtroom unconstitutional); Kimbley v. Lawrence County, 119 F. Supp. 2d 856
(S.D. Ind. 2000) (prohibiting the county from erecting and maintaining a Ten
Commandments monument); Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993),
aff’d, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that a framed copy of the Ten Commandments
in a courtroom by itself violates the Establishment Clause). But see Suhre v. Haywood
County, 55 F. Supp. 2d 384 (W.D.N.C. 1999) (holding a Ten Commandments plaque in a
county courtroom constitutional).
143
See supra notes 33-48, 55-70 and accompanying text.
144
See Noel E. Oman, Jefferson, Hammurabi Join Commandments: Maumelle Court Adds
Words as Deterrent, ARK. DEMOCRAT-GAZETTE, Sept. 11, 2003, available at 2003 WL 62520122
(stating that Maumelle District Court Judge David Pake added the words of Thomas
Jefferson, Hammurabi, Justinian, Blackstone, and Confucius to his courtroom display of the
Ten Commandments). However, not all judges believe a context like this makes a Ten
Commandments display constitutional. See Shirley Ragsdale, State Court Rejects Gift of Ten
Commandments, DES MOINES REG., Sept. 18, 2003, at 1, available at 2003 WL 64150747
(reporting that Iowa Supreme Court Officials turned down a donation of ten historic
plaques because one of the plaques contained the Ten Commandments).
Local governments, to protect themselves against lawsuits, have also moved Ten
Commandments displays to private property or have sold the land the display is located
on to a private party. See Jacoby, supra note 12 (reporting that the ACLU dropped its
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monuments or other Ten Commandments displays as many of these
courts employed an uninformed reasonable observer standard.145
In Adland v. Russ,146 the Kentucky legislature adopted a provision to
relocate a 1971 FOE-donated Ten Commandments monument from its
current spot on the Capital Grounds, where it had sat for three decades,
to a new site near the Floral Clock to become part of a historical and
cultural display.147
The Sixth Circuit declared the display
unconstitutional and began its reasoning by stating that the prominent
placement of the monument would send the unmistakable message that
Kentucky endorses the Ten Commandments.148 The court also held that
a reasonable observer would not be able to identify a unifying theme
between all the monuments and markers.149 Because a reasonable

lawsuit alleging the unconstitutionality of an FOE monument against the City of Frederick,
Maryland, when the city sold the “sliver of land” the monument rested on to a private
party); Mark Wiebe, Commission Decides to Move Ten Commandments off Courthouse Lawn,
KANSAS CITY STAR, July 23, 2003, available at 2003 WL 57903678 (reporting that the Unified
Board of Commissioners of Wyandotte County and Kansas City, Kansas, agreed to move
an FOE monument from the courthouse lawn to a church lawn to drop a threatened
lawsuit by the ACLU). However, this approach has not been successful in the courts. After
a lawsuit was filed against the City of La Crosse, Wisconsin, for displaying an FOE
monument in a city park, the city sold the monument and the 20’ x 22’ parcel of land it sat
on to the FOE. Mercier, 305 F. Supp. 2d at 1002. The court held that the sale violated the
Establishment Clause because the city gave preferential treatment to the FOE’s religious
message over all other messages. Id. at 1011.
145
See infra notes 146-56 and accompanying text.
146
307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002).
147
Id. at 474-75. The Floral Clock, thirty-four feet in diameter and weighing 200,000
pounds, was located in a prominent place on the Capital Grounds and could be seen from
the circular drive leading to the public parking lot. Id. at 477. The historical and cultural
display also included a Kentucky Historical Society memorial sign, a “Welcome to
Kentucky” plaque, a marker memorializing Kentucky POWS, and markers
commemorating an author/journalist, a former governor, a former physical plant director,
and a former cabinet member. Id.
148
Id. at 486. The court also held that Kentucky lacked a secular purpose in erecting the
historical and cultural display because Section 8 of the Resolution, which directed the
display to be erected, did not delineate the specific components of the display other than
the Ten Commandments. Id. at 477, 481. The court concluded this meant that the other
components of the display were secondary in importance to the Ten Commandments. Id.
at 481. This conclusion was bolstered, the court noted, by the fact the FOE monument
physically dwarfed the other seven monuments. Id. at 482.
149
Id. at 488. Additionally, the court held that nothing on the monument depleted the
religious message of the Ten Commandments. Id. at 486-87. The court agreed with the
Seventh Circuit that the linking of religious and secular symbols created an impermissible
link between religion and government. Id.
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observer could not identify a unifying theme, the court reasoned that a
reasonable observer would focus on the monuments separately.150
A reasonable observer also could not identify a unifying theme in
Indiana Civil Liberties Union v. O’Bannon.151 After an FOE monument
donated to the state of Indiana was smashed in 1991, an Indiana state
representative arranged to have a new monument built, one inscribed
with the text of the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, and the
Preamble of the Indiana Constitution.152 The monument was to be
placed in the two-acre park grounds around the capital alongside other
monuments.153 The Seventh Circuit held that the primary effect of the
new monument would be an endorsement of religion.154 The court
reached this conclusion because the monument sat on government
property and a reasonable person would think that the monument
occupied its position with the government’s approval.155 Furthermore,
the court noted that a viewer, when coming from certain directions,
would only be able to see the Ten Commandments and not the other
texts; therefore, the court reasoned that a reasonable observer would be
unable to make any connection between the three texts.156
The same reasonable observer who could not identify a unifying
theme in Adland and O’Bannon could not identify one in ACLU v.
McCreary County.157 In McCreary County, two counties and a school
district erected “Foundations of American Law and Government”
displays.158 Before these displays were erected, the two counties and the
Id.
259 F.3d 766 (7th Cir. 2001).
152
Id. at 768.
153
Id. at 769. The other monuments included two monuments honoring the civil
engineering of the National Road, a monument honoring Indiana women, two monuments
depicting Civil War scenes, a monument describing the capital’s history, and statues of
Christopher Columbus, George Washington, a coal miner, and two Indiana governors. Id.
154
Id. at 772. The court also held that the State of Indiana had not articulated any secular
purpose. Id. The court analyzed a press release issued by Indiana Governor O’Brien in
which he stated that the Ten Commandments would serve as a reminder of the nation’s
core values. Id. at 771. The court rejected this argument because the Ten Commandments,
it reasoned, only served as a reminder of core values for those who adhere to the Ten
Commandments. Id.
155
Id. at 772.
156
Id. at 773. The court further reasoned that if a reasonable observer would be able to
make a connection between the three texts, it would be one of religion, not one of history.
Id.
157
354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003).
158
Id. at 443. The displays included the texts of the Ten Commandments, the Magna
Carta, the Declaration of Independence, the Bill of Rights, the Star-Spangled Banner, the
150
151

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 7

254

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

school district had attempted to display the Ten Commandments in two
other settings.159 The Sixth Circuit held that the present amended
displays most likely violated the Establishment Clause.160 The court first
reasoned that a reasonable observer would not be able to identify a
unifying theme between all the documents.161 Second, the court
reasoned a reasonable observer would perceive endorsement because the
locations of the displays, two courthouses and a public school, were

Mayflower Compact, the Preamble to the Kentucky Constitution, the symbol of Lady
Justice, and the National Motto of the United States. Id.
159
Id. at 441-42. In 1999, the counties and the school district erected framed copies of the
Ten Commandments. Id. at 441. After lawsuits were filed against them, the counties and
the school district amended the displays to include excerpts from the Declaration of
Independence, the Preamble of the Kentucky Constitution, and the Mayflower Compact.
The displays also included statements from the Congressional Record declaring 1983 the
Year of the Bible, statements from President Lincoln declaring April 30, 1863, to be a day of
prayer and humiliation and stating “[t]he Bible is the best gift God has ever given to man,”
and statements from Ronald Reagan declaring 1983 to be the Year of the Bible. Id. at 442.
The plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunction, and the counties and the school
district were ordered to remove the displays. Id. The counties and the school district then
erected the “Foundations of American Law and Government Display.” Id. at 443.
160
Id. at 462. The court issued a preliminary injunction finding that the plaintiffs
demonstrated a likelihood of succeeding on the merits. Id.
161
Id. at 460. The court noted that all the documents, save the Ten Commandments, are
related to Western European or American culture since the year 1215. Id. The court also
stated that the problem of a reasonable observer not knowing the connection between all
the documents as foundations of American law could not be overcome by the counties
merely asserting it. Id.; see also Turner v. Habersham County, 290 F. Supp. 2d 1362 (N.D.
Ga. 2003). In Turner, the county displayed the Ten Commandments alongside the
Declaration of Independence, the Mayflower Compact, the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta,
the National Anthem, and Lady Justice. Turner, 290 F. Supp. 2d at 1366. In declaring the
display unconstitutional, the court explained a reasonable observer, even a reasonable
observer familiar with all the documents, would be unable to explain the connection
between the documents. Id. at 1372. Contra ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d
799 (M.D. Tenn. 2002). In Rutherford County, the county also erected a “Foundations of
American Law and Government” display. Id. at 803. This display included the Mayflower
Compact, the Declaration of Independence, the Ten Commandments, the Magna Carta, the
lyrics of The Star-Spangled Banner, the Preamble to the Tennessee Constitution, the Bill of
Rights, and a picture of Lady Justice. Id. at 803-04. The county included an explanation of
each document’s significance. Id. at 803. Although the court noted that the documents,
except the Ten Commandments, were patriotic in nature, the court held the effect was not
endorsement because the context as a whole conveyed a secular message of patriotism to
the reasonable observer. Id. at 811-12. However, the court did note that the county had
probably not chosen “the most impressive examples” of United States legal history. Id. at
812. According to the court, quotes from Confucius, Muhammad, King John, Louis IX,
John Marshall, Hammurabi, Justinian, and Napoleon may have provided a “more
thoughtfully-constructed display.” Id. Although a reasonable observer would not perceive
endorsement, the court granted the plaintiffs a preliminary injunction because the county
lacked a secular purpose in erecting the display. Id. at 813.
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under government control.162 Third, a reasonable observer would
perceive endorsement because of the history of the displays; a reasonable
observer, the court stated, would be aware of the previous displays and
would know that the controversy surrounding the displays focused only
on the Ten Commandments.163
4.

The Ten Commandments Originally as Part of a Historical Display

Despite the above rulings and the use of an uninformed reasonable
observer by several courts, the ACLU will not challenge the
constitutionality of all public Ten Commandments displays when the
Ten Commandments are portrayed as a historical document alongside
other historical legal documents.164 In 2000, the ACLU challenged an
FOE monument donated to Custer County, Montana.165 The ACLU
agreed to drop its legal challenge if the county agreed to erect an
“Evolution of Law” display.166 The ACLU further agreed that the Ten

162
McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 460-61. Contra Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 812
(reasoning that the location of a courthouse “where justice is administered . . . and local
government is seated” emphasizes the secular role of the Ten Commandments).
163
McCreary County, 354 F.3d at 461.
164
See infra notes 165-68 and accompanying text; see also Christopher Sherman, ACLU
Won’t Fight Monument; the “Rock” in Polk’s Administration Building Includes More Than the
Ten Commandments, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Oct. 3, 2003, at B3, available at 2003 WL 64970722
(reporting that the ACLU will not challenge the constitutionality of the “Foundation Rock”
in Polk County, Florida, and quoting Howard Simon, executive director of the ACLU of
Florida as saying, “Context is everything”). In addition to the Ten Commandments,
Hammurabi’s Code, the Magna Carta, the Mayflower Compact, writings of John Adams,
the preamble to the Florida Constitution, and twelve of the twenty-five declarations of
rights are inscribed on the “Foundation Rock.” Christopher Sherman, Enthusiastic Crowd
Greets Monument a Rock with the Ten Commandments in Polk Sparked Few Protests, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Sept. 12, 2003, at B1, available at 2003 WL 63278911. In addition, the “Foundation
Rock” is dominated by a four hundred pound bronze replica of the Liberty Bell. Id.; cf.
Harvey v. Cobb County, 811 F. Supp. 669 (N.D. Ga. 1993), aff’d, 15 F.3d 1097 (11th Cir. 1994)
(granting a four month stay to Cobb County to make an unconstitutional display of the Ten
Commandments constitutional by hanging non-religious, historical items near the Ten
Commandments).
165
Mary Zeiss Stange, Commentary; Moment to an Inglorious Past; Another Rendition of the
Ten Commandments Finds a Fitting Home, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 26, 2003, at B13, available at 2003
WL 2430025.
166
Consent Agreement, ACLU v. Custer County, (No. DV 99-21843), http://archive.aclu.
org/court/custer_consent.html (last visited Aug. 19, 2004). The “Evolution of Law”
display included the Ten Commandments, the Bill of Rights, the Magna Carta, the English
Bill of Rights, and the Montana Constitution. Id. However, three years after agreement
was reached by the ACLU and Custer County, the county had not erected the other four
monuments. Stange, supra note 165. After the ACLU complained, the county elected to
move the Ten Commandments monument to a museum. Id.
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Commandments display, when placed in the context of a historical
display, would not have the effect of endorsing religion.167
The FOE cases, along with the two cases from the summer of 2003
and the modified display cases, demonstrate that the courts have not
applied the same “reasonable observer” standard in analyzing Ten
Commandments displays. This failure to apply the same standard has
led to inconsistent results: FOE monuments, despite being uniform in
appearance, have been declared both unconstitutional and
constitutional;168 the location of a Ten Commandments monument next
to a legal building may enhance the historical significance of the Ten
Commandments or it may enhance the message of endorsement;169 and a
reasonable observer, when viewing a “Foundations of American Law”
display, may see nine historical documents or eight historical documents
and one religious document.170 These inconsistent decisions are a result
of the courts misapplying the reasonable person standard as articulated
by Justice O’Connor.
IV. AN ANALYSIS OF THE REASONABLE OBSERVER STANDARD
In using the “reasonable observer” standard, most courts have
declared public displays of the Ten Commandments unconstitutional
because the displays conveyed a message of endorsement to the
reasonable observer.171 However, the reasonable observer used by those
Consent Agreement, Custer County (No. DV 99-21843).
See supra text accompanying notes 119-30.
169
See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
170
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
171
See supra text accompanying notes 120-24, 137-40, 142, 149-63. Many of these same
courts have also declared the Ten Commandments displays unconstitutional because
government lacked a secular purpose in erecting the display. See supra notes 129, 134, 148,
154.
Government, in articulating a secular purpose for displaying the Ten
Commandments, must remember that no court has denied the influence of the Ten
Commandments on American law. See Stone v. Graham, 449 U.S. 39, 42 (1980) (stating that
the Ten Commandments may be appropriate in public schools in a study of history); Van
Orden v. Perry, 351 F.3d 173, 181 (5th Cir. 2003) (stating that no one can deny the influence
of the Ten Commandments on American civil and criminal law); cf. Initial Brief of
Appellants at 20-29, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir. 2003) (No. 01-5935)
(describing how each of the Ten Commandments was adopted into American law);
Affidavit of David Barton in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to Plaintiff’s Motion for
Contempt, or, in the Alternative, for Supplemental Preliminary Injunction, ACLU v.
McCreary County 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (No. 99-507), http://www.lc.org/
hotissues/attachments/Affidavit%20-%20David%20Barton%20re%20impact%20of%20ten
%20commandments-%20McCreary.pdf (describing, in thirty-seven pages, how each one of
the Ten Commandments has become deeply entrenched into American law); supra note 115
(describing pictures of the Ten Commandments and Moses throughout the United States’
167
168
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courts is not always the same reasonable observer used by Justice
O’Connor or by other federal courts.172 The cases discussed in Part III of
this Note indicate that four different types of Ten Commandments
monuments or displays exist.173 Part IV of this Note will portray at least
one problem associated with each type of display that demonstrates the
inadequacies of the reasonable observer standard as applied by courts or
as articulated by Justice O’Connor. Part IV.A will address the Ten
Commandments originally as part of a historical display.174 Part IV.B
will discuss the Ten Commandments as an already existing stand-alone
display.175 Part IV.C will address the Ten Commandments as part of a
historical display after having once been a stand-alone display.176 Part
IV.D will analyze the Ten Commandments as a new stand-alone
display.177
A. The Ten Commandments Originally as Part of a Historical Display
Although no court has ruled on the constitutionality of the Ten
Commandments originally displayed as part of a historical display, these

Capital Buildings). But see Steven K. Green, The Fount of Everything Just and Right? The Ten
Commandments as a Source of American Law, 14 J.L. & RELIGION 525 (1999-2000) (arguing that
the only connection between American law and the Ten Commandments is that the Ten
Commandments influenced legal concepts of right and wrong). Therefore, if government
displays the Ten Commandments with the secular purpose of acknowledging the historical
basis of American law, then government has articulated a secular purpose for displaying
the Ten Commandments. Cf. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 683 (1984) (holding that the
city’s primary purpose of displaying the crèche was not to advance religion even though
religion received an “indirect, remote and incidental” benefit).
172
See supra notes 89-94, 120-24, 146-63 and accompanying text.
173
See supra Part III.
174
See infra Part IV.A. For a case and articles addressing the Ten Commandments as
originally part of a historical display, see ACLU v. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d 799
(M.D. Tenn. 2002); supra note 168.
175
See infra Part IV.B. For cases involving the Ten Commandments as an already existing
stand-alone display, see Van Orden, 351 F.3d 173; Freethought Society v. Chester County, 334
F.3d 247 (3d Cir. 2003); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292 (7th Cir. 2000); State v. Freedom
from Religion Foundation, 898 P.2d 1013 (Colo. 1995).
176
See infra Part IV.C. For cases involving the Ten Commandments as part of a historical
display after originally being a stand-alone display, see ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d
438 (6th Cir. 2003); Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471 (6th Cir. 2002).
177
See infra Part IV.D. For a case involving the Ten Commandments as a new standalone display, see Glassroth v. Moore, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003). For Part IV of this
Note, a stand-alone display means any monument containing the Ten Commandments,
which was not erected as part of a historical display, but it may be part of a museum
setting containing other monuments.
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are the displays that the courts will most likely find constitutional.178
Nevertheless, problems the government will face in defending these
displays can be articulated.
First, opponents to the display will argue that the display equates
the Ten Commandments with important historical documents. For
example, the court in McCreary County held that a reasonable observer
when viewing the “Foundations of American Law and Government”
display would see one religious document, the Ten Commandments,
surrounded by eight political documents and would conclude that the
Ten Commandments were “on a par” with the political documents.179
But this reasoning does not comport with the Supreme Court’s reasoning
in either Lynch or Allegheny; in both decisions the Court held that the
context of the display changes the message received by the viewer.180
Therefore, under Lynch and Allegheny, a reasonable observer, when
viewing the Ten Commandments as part of a historical display, would
not view all of the documents separately and place them into categories
of historical documents and religious documents; but rather, the
reasonable observer would only see historical documents that were
important to the foundation of American law because the context of the
Ten Commandments, being surrounded by historical documents,
negated the religious nature of the Ten Commandments.181
Second, opponents to the display will argue that the government
failed to include the necessary documents needed to negate the religious
message of the Ten Commandments. For example, the court in
Rutherford County, although holding that a reasonable observer would
not conclude endorsement from its “Foundation of American Law and
Government” display, hinted that the county may not have chosen the
best documents to include in the display.182 This argument also finds no
merit in Lynch or Allegheny. In deciding which holiday displays violated
the Establishment Clause, the Supreme Court has never stated the
proposition that the constitutionality of a holiday display depends on

See supra notes 162, 164 (explaining that the ACLU agreed to not challenge the
“Foundation Rock” or the Custer County FOE monument). The display in Rutherford
County only granted a preliminary injunction. Rutherford County, 209 F. Supp. 2d at 800.
179
See supra notes 158, 161 and accompanying text.
180
See supra notes 37-38, 47, 48, 62, 66-68 and accompanying text.
181
Cf. supra note 48 and accompanying text (explaining that the setting negated the
religious message of the crèche because everything in the holiday display celebrated a
public holiday).
182
See supra note 161.
178
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exactly what figures or signs are included in the display.183 The displays
in Lynch and Allegheny that the Court found constitutional were
significantly different from each other: the display in Lynch consisted of
a crèche, a Christmas tree, reindeer, carolers, and many other secular
figures, whereas the display in Allegheny consisted only of a menorah, a
Christmas tree, and a sign.184
From these two decisions, it becomes apparent that the
constitutionality of a holiday display does not depend on the particular
contents of the display, but rather on whether the contents change the
context of the religious symbol. However, a holiday display is different
than a Ten Commandments display: a holiday display is erected for
only a month or two each year, whereas a Ten Commandments display
is a permanent display.185 Nonetheless, the same reasoning for holiday
displays should apply to historical displays because although the
historical display is permanent, its context has permanently negated the
religious nature of the Ten Commandments in that display.186 Therefore,
the constitutionality of a historical display that includes the Ten
Commandments should not depend on whether the governmental entity
included certain documents, but on whether the included documents
negate the religious nature of the Ten Commandments.
B. The Ten Commandments as an Already Existing Stand-Alone Display
Ten Commandments displays that have existed for many years raise
the issue of what determines the context of the contested display. In two
of her concurring opinions developing the reasonable observer, Justice
O’Connor enunciated two guidelines in determining the context of the
display.187 First, she stated that factors in determining the context of a

183
See Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“Every
government practice must be judged in its unique circumstances to determine whether it
constitutes an endorsement or disapproval of religion.”).
184
See supra text accompanying notes 34, 56.
185
See, e.g., ACLU v. Schundler, 104 F.3d 1435, 1438 (3d Cir. 1997) (stating that Jersey City
displayed its crèche on the days immediately before and after Christmas and its menorah
on the nine days of Hanukkah); Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 251 (3d
Cir. 2003) (stating that the Ten Commandments plaque had been affixed to the façade of
the courthouse since 1920).
186
In addition, when analyzing public Ten Commandments displays, courts have not
made a distinction between the temporary nature of holiday displays and the permanent
nature of Ten Commandments displays. See, e.g., Adland v. Russ, 307 F.3d 471, 484-90 (6th
Cir. 2002); Books v. City of Elkhart, 235 F.3d 292, 304-07 (7th Cir. 2000).
187
See supra notes 54, 76 and accompanying text.
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statute are its text, legislative history, and implementation.188 Second,
she declared that the history of the government land provided as much
of the display’s context as did its location on government property.189
In addition to these factors, lower courts have held that the history of
the display is also part of its context.190 For example, the Third Circuit in
Freethought Society held that the history of the Ten Commandments
plaque, that it had been affixed to the courthouse facade for eighty years,
was part of the plaque’s context.191 Allowing the history of the contested
display to be part of the context would alleviate Justice Kennedy’s
concern that the Endorsement Test would invalidate many traditional
practices.192 For example, if a person concluded endorsement after
hearing a President’s Thanksgiving Proclamation, that person would not
succeed in a lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Proclamation
because that person would know that all Presidents, starting with
George
Washington,
have
issued
religious
Thanksgiving
Proclamations.193
Allowing the history of the display to be part of its context reenforces the idea that the purpose of the Establishment Clause is to
prohibit government from making religion relevant to political life,
rather than from prohibiting acknowledgements of religion that merely
make people feel uncomfortable.194 Many of the FOE monuments
existed for forty years before their constitutionality was challenged and
the plaque on the Chester County courthouse had been affixed to the
courthouse facade for eighty years.195 Although these long-standing
monuments may bring discomfort to atheists, Muslims, or Hindus,196 the
monuments are not completely religious in nature because they have
gained civic significance,197 and this civic significance should be

See supra text accompanying note 54.
See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
190
See supra notes 89, 135.
191
Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 260 n.10 (3d Cir. 2003).
192
See supra note 58.
193
See supra note 58.
194
See supra note 46.
195
See supra text accompanying notes 121, 127, 134.
196
See supra note 73 (explaining that government has not made religion relevant to one’s
political standing merely when one feels uncomfortable viewing a religious display).
197
See City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1063 (2001) (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting)
(“[A] monument which has stood for more than forty years . . . has at least as much civic
significance as it does religious.”).
188
189
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protected.198 This civic significance can be protected if the history of a
Ten Commandments monument is treated similarly to the nature of
government property, so that the reasonable observer is imputed not
with knowledge of the precise history of the monument but with
knowledge of the approximate age of the monument.199 Because
imputing the reasonable observer with knowledge of the forum nature of
government property protects private speech allowed by the
government,200 imputing the reasonable observer with knowledge of the
general history of a Ten Commandments monument would protect the
monuments that have gained civic significance.
Already existing stand-alone Ten Commandments displays also
raise the issue of whether the Endorsement Test can provide consistent
results. A major criticism of the Lemon Test was that it yielded
irreconcilable and inconsistent results,201 and one of Justice O’Connor’s
goals in developing the Endorsement Test was to provide a test capable
of consistent application.202 But because the Endorsement Test is so factdependant, meaning that the constitutionality of a Ten Commandments
monument depends on its placement in relation to the main entrance of a
municipal building or that the constitutionality of a menorah depends on
its height in comparison to the height of a Christmas tree, a
“jurisprudence of minutiae” has and will continue to develop.203
An example of this jurisprudence of minutiae can be seen in Justice
Blackmun’s reasoning in Allegheny.204 Justice Blackmun held that the
eighteen-foot menorah was constitutional because it was located to the
side of the forty-five foot Christmas tree, which was centered under the
building’s archway.205 However, by Justice Blackmun’s reasoning,
another holiday display consisting of a menorah and a Christmas tree
might be declared unconstitutional if the Christmas tree was only fifteen
feet taller than the menorah, rather than twenty-seven feet, and if the
display as a whole, rather than just the Christmas tree, was centered

198
Cf. supra note 89 (explaining that the Third Circuit upheld Jersey City’s practice of
displaying a crèche and a menorah during the holiday season because it was part of the
city’s tradition of celebrating diverse cultural events).
199
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
200
See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
201
See supra note 29.
202
See supra notes 52, 58.
203
See County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 674 (1989) (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
204
See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
205
See supra text accompanying notes 66-68.
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under the archway.206 A jurisprudence of minutiae has developed when
one display is declared constitutional and another display
unconstitutional because of a few feet in height and centering.
Unfortunately, a jurisprudence of minutiae has already developed in
cases involving FOE monuments. Although the FOE monuments are
exact replicas of each other,207 courts have reached different conclusions
regarding their constitutionality based upon their location in relation to
government buildings and other monuments.208 A comparison of the
locations of the FOE monuments in Books, Van Orden and Freedom from
Religion Foundation will portray this jurisprudence of minutiae.209 The
monument in Books, along with two other monuments, was located on
the twenty-five foot wide front lawn of the municipal building.210 This
monument was declared unconstitutional.211 The monument in Freedom
from Religion Foundation was located on the three block Capital Complex
Grounds along with fifteen other monuments.212 The closest monument
to the FOE monument was thirty feet away.213 The FOE monument was
also located adjacent to a sidewalk.214 The monument in Van Orden was
located on the twenty-two acre Texas State Capital Grounds, along with
sixteen other monuments.215 These two monuments were declared
constitutional.216
These cases can be reconciled on two different grounds. First, the
cases can be reconciled by the fact that the Ten Commandments
monument in Books was in front of the government building, while the
monuments in Van Orden and Freedom from Religion Foundation were
located further away from government buildings.217 Second, the cases
can be reconciled by the fact that the monuments in Van Orden and in
Freedom from Religion Foundation were one of multiple monuments
located throughout their respective state capital grounds, while the
monument in Books was only one of three monuments.218 However,
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
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See supra note 119.
See supra notes 120-30 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121, 127.
See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
See supra note 122.
See supra note 122.
See supra note 122.
See supra note 127.
See supra notes 122, 128 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-22, 127 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 121-22, 127 and accompanying text.
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reconciling these cases on either of these two grounds does not provide
courts in subsequent Ten Commandments cases with any clear
standards.
The problem with the first reconciliation is that “in front” provides
no clear definition. Courts could interpret “in front” to mean directly in
front of the building, closer to the main sidewalk than the government
building, anywhere but behind the building, or visible to a person
approaching the front entrance. In addition, this reconciliation would
only provide constitutional protection to a majority of people visiting the
government building—those using the front entrance. In Freedom from
Religion Foundation, those people who walk through the State Capital
Grounds and past the Ten Commandments monument, rather than
using the main entrance, would receive no constitutional protection
because they have chosen not to use the most popular method of
accessing the State Capital. Constitutional protection should not depend
on the actions of the majority.219
The problem with the second reconciliation is that it would require
courts to come up with a mathematical formula that considers the square
footage of the government property and the number of monuments.
Although the lawn in Books contained only three monuments, the lawn
consisted of a much smaller area than the grounds in either Van Orden or
in Freedom from Religion Foundation.220 More than likely, a visitor to the
municipal building in Elkhart, Indiana, would be able to see all three
monuments at once.221 However, a visitor to the Capital Grounds in
either Colorado or Texas may only be able to see one or two monuments
at once.222 Furthermore, requiring courts to determine if government has
included enough monuments in a certain area does not comport with the
Supreme Court’s requirement that the surrounding monuments, despite
the number or their exact location, change the context of the religious
element.223

See supra text accompanying footnote 43 (stating constitutional protection depends on
the messages conveyed).
220
See supra notes 121, 127.
221
See supra note 121 and accompanying text (explaining that the three monuments were
located on a twenty-five foot lawn).
222
See supra notes 122, 127 (explaining that in Colorado sixteen monuments were located
through three square blocks and that in Texas seventeen monuments were located through
twenty-two acres).
223
See supra Part III.A.
219
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C. The Ten Commandments as Part of a Historical Display After Having Been
a Stand-Alone Display
The amount of knowledge that should be imputed to a reasonable
observer is an issue raised in analyzing a Ten Commandments
monument that has been integrated into a historical display after
originally being a stand-alone display. Throughout her concurring
opinions, Justice O’Connor has imputed the reasonable observer with
knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of the challenged government
action.224 The holdings of lower courts have shown that imputing the
reasonable observer with the knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of
the government action generally permits the government to publicly
acknowledge religion.225
However, one argument against imputing the reasonable observer
with knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of the display is that it
precludes the government from modifying any display.226 The argument
asserts that the reasonable observer, once aware of the unconstitutional
display, would conclude that government intended to convey the same
religious message despite the secular additions.227 In fact, the court in
McCreary County relied on this proposition and held that the county’s
“Foundations of American Law” display was unconstitutional because a
reasonable observer would know that the county had erected the
historical display only after the fear of litigation arose.228 This argument
against imputing too much knowledge to the reasonable observer,
although thought-provoking, is weakened after considering that the
Supreme Court has provided so few standards relating to Ten
Commandments displays.229
Requiring government to erect a
See supra note 48.
See Capital Square Review & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753 (1995) (imputing
knowledge that the government land is a public forum allowed the Ku Klux Klan to
display its crosses); Brooks v. City of Oak Ridge, 222 F.3d 259 (6th Cir. 2000) (imputing
knowledge that the “Friendship Bell” was to commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of the
nuclear attacks on Japan allowed the city to erect a bell resembling a bell found in Buddhist
temples); ACLU v. Schundler, 168 F.3d 92 (3d Cir. 1999) (imputing knowledge of the city’s
past celebrations of different religious events allowed the city to erect a holiday display);
Elewski v. City of Syracuse, 123 F.3d 51 (2d Cir. 1997) (imputing knowledge of the city’s
other holiday decorations allowed the city to erect a crèche). But see Glassroth v. Moore,
335 F.3d 1292 (11th Cir. 2003) (imputing knowledge of the Chief Justice’s earlier campaigns
prohibited the Chief Justice from erecting a Ten Commandments monument).
226
Acri, supra note 89, at 198.
227
Id.
228
See supra text accompanying note 163.
229
See supra note 102 (explaining that the Supreme Court has only ruled on one case
concerning the Ten Commandments).
224
225
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constitutional display of the Ten Commandments the first time, when
government has few standards to use as guidelines and when courts
have issued inconsistent decisions, is an unrelenting and demanding
burden to place on government.230
Nonetheless, the underlying aspect of this argument is whether the
reasonable person should be an informed observer or whether the
reasonable observer can be an unknowledgeable passerby; this is the
exact point that Justice Stevens and Justice O’Connor disagreed on in
Pinette.231 Justice Stevens stated that the reasonable observer should not
be required to know the general history of a display because this would
prohibit those without that knowledge, such as schoolchildren, traveling
salesmen, and tourists, from being protected against government
endorsement of religion.232 However, Justice O’Connor argued that
allowing anybody to be the reasonable person would prohibit all
government acknowledgement of religion because there would always
be someone who would infer endorsement.233
Adopting Justice Stevens’ definition of the reasonable observer
would allow anybody not aware of the history of the challenged display
to invalidate a government practice that only indirectly and remotely
benefits religion. If this definition were adopted, a traveling salesman,
without knowing the history of Oak Ridge or the “Friendship Bell,”
could infer that Oak Ridge was endorsing Buddhism by displaying the
bell,234 or an electrician touring through the Borough of Tenafly, without
knowing that the borough does not strictly enforce its ordinance, could
infer that the borough was advocating Judaism by allowing Jews to hang
lechis on telephone poles.235 The effect of allowing any passerby to
invalidate a government practice would, for all practical purposes,
prohibit government from making any acknowledgement of God, and
this is something that the Supreme Court has never interpreted the
Constitution as requiring.236 By imputing the reasonable observer with
knowledge of the “history and ubiquity” of a display, courts rightfully
prohibit anybody from invalidating a government practice unless they
know the history of the display.
Initial Brief of Appellants at 45, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir.
2003) (No. 01-5935).
231
See supra notes 72-81 and accompanying text.
232
See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text.
233
See supra note 73.
234
See supra note 94.
235
See supra note 92.
236
See supra note 20.
230
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D. The Ten Commandments as a New Stand-Alone Display
Pursuant to the holdings in Lynch and Allegheny,237 courts are going
to have a very difficult time finding newly erected stand-alone displays
of the Ten Commandments on government property constitutional.
First, unlike the context of the menorah in Allegheny,238 nothing in the
generic context of a new stand-alone display negates the religious nature
of the Ten Commandments.239 In addition, unlike stand-alone displays
that have existed for several decades, new stand-alone displays do not
have history as part of their context.240 Second, unlike the crèche in
Lynch,241 a public Ten Commandments monument is not located on
private property; rather, it is located at a courthouse, in a courtroom, or
on capital grounds, which are properties that are likely to be known by
almost all as government-owned.242
Furthermore, one can argue that a new stand-alone Ten
Commandments display is more religious than a stand-alone crèche,
such as the one in Allegheny.243 A person with no knowledge of either a
crèche or the Ten Commandments receives two different messages when
viewing them. When viewing the crèche, this person would see a father
and a mother, along with shepherds and animals, gazing at a newborn
baby.244 The crèche itself, without any context, does not yield a religious
message. On the other hand, the Ten Commandments clearly yield a
religious message; the first line on FOE monuments reads, “ THE TEN
COMMANDMENTS—I AM the LORD thy God.”245 A person with no
knowledge of the Ten Commandments would conclude that the Ten
Commandments play an integral role to the religions that worship God.
Against this backdrop, one could almost conclude that it would be
impossible for a court to declare a new stand-alone display
constitutional.

See supra notes 33-48, 55-70 and accompanying text.
See supra text accompanying note 56.
239
See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
240
See supra Part IV.B.
241
See supra note 34.
242
Cf. supra note 75 and accompanying text (explaining that both Justice O’Connor and
Justice Kennedy agreed that the reasonable observer would know that Capital Square was
government property).
243
See supra text accompanying notes 59-64.
244
See supra note 34.
245
City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058, 1059 (2001). Justice Stevens wrote, “The
graphic emphasis placed on those first lines is rather hard to square with the proposition
that the monument expresses no particular religious preference.” Id.
237
238
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However, the Ten Commandments are different than a crèche or a
menorah, despite all three never having lost their religious nature.246
Unlike a crèche or a menorah, the Ten Commandments played a role in
establishing American law. Present day courts admit that the last six
commandments—honor your parents, do not kill, do not commit
adultery, do not steal, do not give false testimony, and do not covet—are
moral laws.247 However, historians have also traced the first four
commandments—no other gods, no graven images, do not swear, and
honor the Sabbath—as having been incorporated into American law.248
First, the colonies incorporated the first four commandments into
their respective laws.249
For example, in 1680, New Hampshire
prohibited any man from openly worshipping or having another god.250
In 1610, Virginia prohibited any man from impiously or maliciously
speaking against the Trinity and stated that any man who blasphemes
the name of God will be put to death.251 In 1682, Pennsylvania required
that all business be deferred from the Lord’s Day to the next day, unless
an emergency arose.252
Second, the Founding Fathers believed that the Ten Commandments
were a sum of the law.253 John Quincy Adams, the fifth United States
president, wrote:
The law given from Sinai was a civil and municipal as
well as a moral and religious code . . . laws essential to
the existence of men in society and most of which have
been enacted by every nation which ever professed any
See supra notes 34, 56, 105.
See supra note 105.
248
See Initial Brief of Appellants at 9, ACLU v. McCreary County, 354 F.3d 438 (6th Cir.
2003) (No. 01-5935); Affidavit of David Barton in Support of Defendant’s Opposition to
Plaintiff’s Motion for Contempt, or, in the Alternative, for Supplemental Preliminary
Injunction, ACLU v. McCreary County, 145 F. Supp. 2d 845 (E.D. Ky. 2001) (No. 99-507),
http://www.lc.org/hotissues/attachments/Affidavit%20-%20David%20Barton%20re%20
impact%20of%20ten%20commandments-%20McCreary.pdf.
249
See infra notes 255-57 and accompanying text.
250
GENERAL LAW AND LIBERTIES OF NEW HAMPSHIRE (1680), reprinted in COLONIAL
ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 6 (Donald S. Lutz
ed., 1998).
251
ARTICLES, LAWS, AND ORDERS, DIVINE, POLITIC, AND MARTIAL FOR THE COLONY IN
VIRGINIA (1610-1611), reprinted in COLONIAL ORIGINS, supra note 250, at 316.
252
CHARTER OF LIBERTIES AND FRAME OF GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF
PENNSYLVANIA IN AMERICA (1682), reprinted in COLONIAL ORIGINS, supra note 250, at 281.
253
DAVID BARTON, ORIGINAL INTENT: THE COURTS, THE CONSTITUTION, & RELIGION 173
(2d ed. 1997).
246
247
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code of laws. Vain indeed would be the search among
the writings of profane antiquity [secular history] . . . to
find so broad, so complete and so solid a basis for
morality as this decalogue [Ten Commandments] lays
down.254
William Findley, a soldier in the Revolutionary War and a U.S.
Congressman stated, “[I]t pleased God to deliver, on Mount Sinai, a
compendium of this holy law and to write it with His own hand on
durable tables of stone. This law, which is commonly called the Ten
Commandments or Decalogue . . . was incorporated in the judicial
law.”255 Finally, John Weatherspoon, a signer of the Declaration of
Independence stated, “[T]he Ten Commandments . . . are the sum of the
moral law.”256
Next, the third commandment continued to appear in court
decisions in the twentieth century. In 1921, the Maine Supreme Court
held that crime of blasphemy can be committed by using “reproachful
language” against God.257 In 1944, the Florida Supreme Court stated that
profanity means “words denoting ‘irreverence of God and holy
things.’”258 In addition, the fourth commandment continues to play a
role in governing society. The Supreme Court declared in 1961 that
Sunday closing laws are constitutional.259 The Constitution excludes
Sundays from the ten days in which the President has to sign a bill
passed by Congress.260 Various states have enacted laws restricting the
sale of alcohol on Sunday.261
Although these examples prove that all ten of the commandments
were incorporated into American law at some time, it is unlikely that any
court will impute knowledge of these specific quotes, court holdings, or
statutes to the reasonable observer.262 Indeed, a court that is unwilling to
JOHN QUINCY ADAMS, LETTERS OF JOHN QUINCY ADAMS TO HIS SON ON THE BIBLE AND
ITS TEACHINGS 61, 70-71 (1850), quoted in BARTON, supra note 253, at 172.
255
WILLIAM FINDLEY, OBSERVATIONS ON “THE TWO SONS OF OIL” 22-23 (1812), quoted in
BARTON, supra note 253, at 173.
256
JOHN WEATHERSPOON, WORKS 95 (1815), quoted in BARTON, supra note 253, at 173.
257
State v. Mockus, 113 A. 39, 42 (Me. 1921).
258
Cason v. Baskin, 20 So. 2d 243, 247 (Fla. 1944).
259
McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
260
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
261
See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 7.1-3-1-14 (West Supp. 2004); IOWA CODE ANN. §
123.49(2)(b) (West Supp. 2004); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 66.16.080 (West 2001).
262
See Freethought Soc’y v. Chester County, 334 F.3d 247, 268 n.12 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“[I]ndeed, the assumption . . . that the reasonable observer knows about . . . statements
254
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make the reasonable observer aware of the connection between the Ten
Commandments and the Magna Carta, the Declaration of Independence,
the Bill of Rights, and the Mayflower Compact,263 is not going to allow
the reasonable observer to have knowledge of quotes said over two
hundred years ago.
However, the reasonable person standard can be applied in such a
way as to make newly erected stand-alone displays constitutional. To
start, in cases involving public forums, Justice O’Connor and lower
courts have not required that the reasonable observer know of specific
instances of how the land was previously used, only that the land had
been used in the past by different groups.264 Similarly, a reasonable
observer would not have to be imputed with knowledge of specific
quotes by Founding Fathers, specific colonial laws, or specific court
holdings, but only with the general knowledge that the Ten
Commandments served as a basis for American law.
But it must now be analyzed whether this knowledge can be
imputed to a reasonable observer. Although courts have not articulated
specific standards on how to determine the knowledge of the reasonable
observer,265 a number of principles regarding the knowledge of the
reasonable observer are apparent from previous cases.
First, a
reasonable observer does not have infinite knowledge.266 Second, the
reasonable observer may have more knowledge than the average
person.267 Third, the reasonable observer takes actions to inform himself
or herself.268 Based on these principles, it is not ill-fitting to impute the
reasonable observer with the knowledge that the Ten Commandments
served as a basis for American law. By only imputing this general
knowledge, rather than knowledge of specific laws, quotes, and court
holdings, the reasonable observer is recognized as not having infinite
knowledge. Because every tourist or school child may not have this
made by John Adams or the holdings of state court cases seems highly questionable.”); cf.
Glassroth v. Moore, 229 F. Supp. 2d 1290, 1303 (M.D. Ala. 2002), aff’d, 335 F.3d 1282 (11th
Cir. 2003), cert. denied, U.S.L.W. 3309 (U.S. Nov. 3, 2003) (No. 03-486) (not imputing the
reasonable observer with knowledge of Judge Moore’s numerous speeches over the past
two years).
263
See supra note 161 and accompanying text.
264
See supra notes 76, 93 and accompanying text.
265
Cf. Choper, Endorsement Test, supra note 29, at 510-21 (arguing the reasonable observer
standard is decided by what judges think a reasonable observer should know).
266
See supra notes 94, 140.
267
See supra note 89.
268
See supra note 93 (explaining that the reasonable observer follows local politics and
reads the newspaper).
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general knowledge, the reasonable observer is recognized as having
more knowledge than the average person. Furthermore, this general
knowledge is not greater than other knowledge imputed to the
reasonable observer by lower courts, such as detailed knowledge of the
New Testament,269 knowledge of the significance of lechis for Orthodox
Jews,270 and knowledge of the general history of a county.271
Even if the knowledge that the Ten Commandments served as a
basis for American law is imputed to the reasonable observer, it also
must be analyzed how the reasonable observer will treat this knowledge
when viewing a newly erected stand-alone Ten Commandments
monument.272 Foremost to this analysis is the monument’s location on
government property.273 Not surprisingly, Supreme Court Justices have
disagreed on how the location of a Ten Commandments monument on
government property will affect a reasonable observer.274 Chief Justice
Rehnquist argued that displaying the Ten Commandments outside a
municipal building “emphasizes the foundational role of the Ten
Commandments in secular, legal matters.”275
Justice Stevens
disagreed.276 He not only advocated for a per se rule that a display with
religious features on government property was an implicit endorsement
by government,277 he also stated that it is hard to square the idea that
government is not endorsing religion when the Ten Commandments
begin with such a religious statement.278
The opinions of Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Stevens illustrate
the opposing messages a person may receive when viewing a Ten
Commandments monument on government property, and lower courts
have aligned themselves with both Justices.279 The problem with
analyzing how a reasonable person would react to a Ten
Commandments monument on government property, it is argued, is that
persons of different religious persuasions differ on what is reasonable.280
See supra note 89.
See supra text accompanying note 92.
271
See supra text accompanying note 135.
272
See supra note 122.
273
Cf. supra text accompanying note 80.
274
See City of Elkhart v. Books, 532 U.S. 1058 (2001).
275
Id. at 1062 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
276
Id. at 1058.
277
See supra text accompanying note 80.
278
City of Elkhart, 532 U.S. at 1058.
279
See supra notes 124, 148, 155, 162 and accompanying text.
280
See supra note 64 (explaining that reasonable people of different religions are going to
disagree on what constitutes an endorsement of religion). Even people of the same religion
269
270
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The criticism of making the relevant perceptions come from a
“reasonable person” is that “reasonable,” when used in contexts such as
contracts, torts, and criminal law, standardizes judgment.281 However,
the reasonable observer standard is not dependent on what one believes
or on whether one thinks the beliefs of another are reasonable, but
rather, it is dependent upon how one reacts to government
acknowledgements of religion,282 and that reaction can be
standardized.283
Courts have laid down principles on how a reasonable observer
reacts to government acknowledgements of religion. First, a reasonable
observer is not hostile to religion.284 Second, a reasonable observer uses
his or her knowledge to provide context to the display.285 Applying
these two principles, a reasonable observer, knowing that the Ten
Commandments influenced American law, will understand that
government is only recognizing one of the influences of American law.
In addition, because the reasonable observer is not hostile to religion, the
reasonable observer will not dismiss this secular purpose even if it
indirectly benefits religion.
Therefore, under the Endorsement Test, all four types of Ten
Commandments displays can be constitutional, provided government
has a permissible secular reason for erecting the display.286
Unfortunately, many courts have been unwilling to adopt parts of the
foregoing analysis.287 Because of this unwillingness, this Note will
can differ on what constitutes an endorsement of religion. Beth Hatcher, Controversy
Surrounding Display Splits Preachers, ATHENS BANNER-HERALD, Oct. 13, 2003,
http://www.onlineathens.com/stories/101303/new_20031013013.shtml (last visited Aug.
4, 2003).
281
See supra note 64.
282
See supra note 43 and accompanying text (explaining that the Endorsement Test
focuses on the message actually conveyed by a religious monument to determine how
viewers react to the display).
283
Cf. supra notes 76, 91, 93 and accompanying text (explaining that when a reasonable
observer sees a religious display, the reasonable observer recalls prior events and uses that
knowledge in determining the purpose of the religious display).
284
Cf. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 84 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concurring) (stating that the
Establishment Clause is not hostile to religion); supra text accompanying notes 39-40, 52
(explaining that some acknowledgement of religion by government is okay).
285
See supra note 91 (explaining that a reasonable observer upon seeing a crèche during
the holiday season would remember seeing the other Christmas decorations throughout
the city); supra note 93 (explaining that a reasonable observer upon seeing a religious
display on a public forum would remember the previous displays on the same land).
286
See supra Part IV.A-D.
287
See supra notes 120-24, 143-63 and accompanying text.
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propose a new test to analyze public Ten Commandments displays that
will provide more objective standards. These objective standards will
allow courts to hand down more consistent holdings and recognize the
civic significance of already existing stand-alone displays and the
historical significance of the Ten Commandments as a basis of American
law.
V. A PROPOSED TEST
Numerous problems have resulted from courts applying the
reasonable observer standard to public displays of the Ten
Commandments. By applying this standard, courts have often ignored
the civic significance of long-standing displays;288 they have reached
inconsistent results by focusing extensively on the context of the
display;289 and they have prohibited government from recognizing the
Ten Commandments as one of the foundations of American law.290
Despite these problems, all four types of displays can be constitutional.291
Part V of this Note proposes a new test for courts to use in analyzing
public Ten Commandments displays. This proposed test discards the
reasonable person standard, preventing courts from imputing only the
necessary knowledge to the reasonable observer to reach the court’s
desired result.292 Instead, the test proposed by this Note focuses on the
type of the Ten Commandments display. Focusing on the type of
display allows the historical significance of the Ten Commandments and
the civic significance of certain monuments to be recognized, while still
allowing the display’s context to remain a determining factor. Under
this proposed test, courts will engage in a two-step analysis to determine
the constitutionality of public Ten Commandments displays. First, the
court determines the type of display from one of four choices.293 Second,
the court engages in the applicable test to determine if the display
violates the Establishment Clause.294

288
289
290
291
292
293
294
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See supra text accompanying notes 120-24.
See supra notes 120-30, 162 and accompanying text; see also supra Part IV.B.
See supra notes 156, 161 and accompanying text; see also supra Part IV.D.
See supra Part IV.
See supra note 54.
See infra Part V.A.
See infra Part V.B.
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A. The Four Types of Ten Commandments Displays
Under the proposed test, the first step in analyzing the
constitutionality of a public Ten Commandments display is for the court
to identify the display type. Four different types of Ten Commandments
displays exist:
1.

A Newly Erected Stand-Alone Display: A newly
erected stand-alone display is a display that contains
the text of only the Ten Commandments and has not
gained local civic significance.

2.

An Already Existing Stand-Alone Display: An
already existing stand-alone display is a display that
contains the text of only the Ten Commandments and
has gained local civic significance.

3.

Originally as Part of a Historical Display: The Ten
Commandments are originally part of a historical
display when the display contains the text of the Ten
Commandments and other historical legal documents
and when the first time the disputed Ten
Commandments display was erected, it was within
the historical display.

4.

As Part of a Historical Display After Originally
Being a Stand-Alone Display:
The Ten
Commandments are part of a historical display after
originally being a stand-alone display when the
display contains the text of the Ten Commandments
and other historical legal documents and when the
disputed display of the Ten Commandments became
part of a historical display after it had previously
been a stand-alone display.

Requiring courts to first determine the type of display forces them to
begin with an objective inquiry, instead of a subjective determination,
into the knowledge of the reasonable observer. Beginning with an
objective inquiry should provide for more consistent results.
Although most Ten Commandments displays can easily be placed
into one of the four categories, a few clarifications and warnings need to
be given. First, while stand-alone displays contain the text of only the
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Ten Commandments, they may contain engravings and plaques.295
Second, a historical display may be a single monument with texts of
various documents engraved on it, a series of framed documents, or a
series of monuments.296
This Note further recognizes that because the provided definitions
offer no guidelines for when a stand-alone display has gained civic
significance, courts will struggle in determining when a stand-alone
display has gained local civic significance. Without a doubt, not all cases
will be as clear as the FOE displays, many of which stood for thirty to
forty years without being challenged,297 the plaque on the facade of the
Chester County courthouse, which stood for eighty years before being
challenged,298 or, on the other end of the spectrum, Judge Moore’s
monument, which was surrounded by controversy for the entire two
years of its existence.299 While this Note recognizes that courts will
struggle with this issue, it does not want to set an arbitrary time period
for when a display has gained civic significance because each display
and community is unique and courts need to consider the characteristics
of each display and its community.300 However, this Note does provide
the following factors that courts could use to determine if a display has
civic significance: the age of the display, the number of times the display
has been relocated, the amount of present controversy regarding the
display, the donor of the display and his or her relationship to the
community, and any designations labeling the display or its location a
historical landmark.
Courts may also struggle defining displays, which contain many
documents, and therefore, are historical displays by definition but in
which the Ten Commandments are significantly more prominent than
any other document. Supporters of the display will argue that such a
display is a historical display, while opponents will argue it is a standalone display.301 This Note suggests treating such a display as a
historical display in order to maintain consistency in defining displays
See supra note 119 (describing the various engravings and plaques on the FOE
monuments).
296
See supra notes 147, 152, 158 and accompanying text (describing various historical
displays).
297
See supra text accompanying notes 121, 127.
298
See supra text accompanying note 134.
299
See supra note 1.
300
Cf. supra Part IV.A (explaining that each display must be analyzed under its unique
circumstances).
301
See infra Part V.B.
295
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and to prevent courts from recasting displays as a different type to get
the court’s desired result. In addition, the proposed test for historical
displays considers the size of the Ten Commandments in relation to the
size of the other documents.302
B. The Proposed Test for Each Type of Display
After determining the type of display, the courts must then engage
in the appropriate test. Because each type of display has a different
history and a different context, each type of display is afforded its own
test.
1.

A Newly Erected Stand-Alone Display

A newly erected stand-alone display contains the text of only the Ten
Commandments and has not yet gained civic significance.303 The
proposed test for a newly erected stand-alone display is:
A newly erected stand-alone display shall be presumed
unconstitutional unless the government can show that several
elements in the display, or its context, negate the religious
nature of the Ten Commandments.
This proposed test recognizes that newly erected stand-alone
displays can be constitutional by permitting government to overcome
the presumption of unconstitutionality. However, this proposed test
also recognizes that often nothing in the display or its context negates the
religious nature of the Ten Commandments.304 Because the display often
contains nothing to negate the religious nature of the Ten
Commandments, the presumption is that the display is unconstitutional
and the burden to prove the display is constitutional is on the
government.305 The burden on the government only requires it to prove
that several elements negate the religious nature of the Ten
Commandments;306 the test does not require government to prove that
these elements significantly negate the religious nature of the Ten
Commandments. This is because a Ten Commandments display is a

See infra Part V.B.3.
See supra Part V.A; supra note 177.
304
See supra Part IV.D.
305
See infra Parts V.B.2-4 (explaining that because the other types of displays have
contexts which negate the religious nature of the Ten Commandments, the presumption is
that those displays are constitutional).
306
See supra note 295 and accompanying text.
302
303
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passive display; any observer can avoid seeing the display by diverting
his or her eyes.307 Elements which could negate the religious nature of
the Ten Commandments include:
the display’s location,308 the
integration of symbols from different religions on the monument,309 and
a plaque recognizing the donor of the monument and stating the
purpose in displaying the monument.310
2.

An Already Existing Stand-Alone Display

An already existing stand-alone display contains the text of only the
Ten Commandments and has gained local civic significance.311 The
proposed test for an already existing stand-alone display is:
An already existing stand-alone display shall be presumed
constitutional unless it is shown that the religious significance
of the display significantly outweighs the civic significance.
By presuming that an already existing display is constitutional, this
proposed test allows government to recognize the civic significance of
the display. The proposed test comports with Justice O’Connor’s
definition of the reasonable observer in two ways. First, by presuming
this display to be constitutional, courts cannot declare the display
unconstitutional
merely
because
one
individual
perceives
endorsement.312 Courts can only declare the display unconstitutional if
the religious nature of the display substantially outweighs the civic
nature. Possible ways to show that the religious nature significantly
outweighs the civic nature could include showing that the public
controversy regarding the display has not dissipated since the display
was erected, or showing that local citizens see the display as a place of
worship. Second, by presuming this display to be constitutional, this
proposed test rejects Justice Stevens’ argument that any display on

307
See supra note 58 (explaining that Justice Kennedy did not see the crèche in Allegheny
as a violation of the Establishment Clause because it was a passive display and observers
could divert their eyes to avoid seeing it).
308
See supra note 122 (explaining that the Colorado Supreme Court found an FOE
monument constitutional in part because it was in the vicinity of fifteen other monuments).
309
See supra note 124 (explaining that the Colorado Supreme Court concluded an FOE
monument symbolized tolerance of other religions because a Star of David and a symbol of
Christ were inscribed on the monument).
310
See supra note 119 (explaining that the FOE monuments contained a plaque stating
that the monument had been donated by the FOE).
311
See supra Part V.A.; supra note 175.
312
See supra note 73.
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government property is a per se violation of the Establishment Clause.313
By rejecting Justice Stevens’ per se violation argument, government is
not prohibited from making acknowledgments of religion that provide
an indirect and remote benefit to religion.314 In addition, by presuming
this display to be constitutional, the danger of creating a “jurisprudence
of minutiae” feared by Justice Kennedy is removed.315 Courts no longer
have to analyze where the monument is located in relation to the center
of the archway or to the front door of the municipal building.316
3.

Originally as Part of a Historical Display

The Ten Commandments are originally part of a historical display
when the display contains the text of other historical legal documents
and when the first time the Ten Commandments were erected, they were
part of the historical display.317
The proposed test for a Ten
Commandments monument originally part of a historical display is:
A Ten Commandments monument originally part of a
historical display shall be presumed constitutional unless it
can be shown that the government lacked any intent to display
the Ten Commandments as a historical document.
By presuming that a historical display is constitutional, this
proposed test allows government to recognize the historical significance
of the Ten Commandments without first determining if a reasonable
observer would be able to establish a historical connection between the
documents.318
But by allowing the display to be declared
unconstitutional if the opponents can prove that government had no
intent to display the Ten Commandments as a historical document, this
proposed test does not let government hide behind an impermissible
purpose.
This proposed test is consistent with the Supreme Court’s analyses
in Lynch and Allegheny, in which the Court paid close attention to the
context of the holiday displays.319 Historical displays are granted a

See supra text accompanying note 80.
See supra text accompanying notes 39-41, 52.
315
See supra note 58; see also Part IV.B (demonstrating how a “jurisprudence of minutiae”
has been created with the reasonable person standard).
316
See supra Part IV.B.
317
See supra Part V.A; supra note 174.
318
See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
319
See supra text accompanying notes 33-48, 55-70.
313
314

Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2004

Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 39, No. 1 [2004], Art. 7

278

VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 39

presumption of constitutionality because the context of the Ten
Commandments—surrounded by historical legal documents—negates
the religious nature of the Ten Commandments.320 In addition, by
presuming that the other historical legal documents have negated the
religious nature of the Ten Commandments, a court is prevented from
declaring a historical display unconstitutional merely because it believes
that government did not include the necessary documents.321 The
context of the display, however, may also be strong evidence to support
the opponent’s argument that government acted with no intention to
display the Ten Commandments as a historical document. For example,
the opponents of the display could prove that government had no
intention to acknowledge the historical value of the Ten Commandments
by showing that the Ten Commandments are double the size of any
other document.
4.

As Part of a Historical Display After Originally Being a Stand-Alone
Display

The Ten Commandments are part of a historical display after
originally being a stand-alone display when the Ten Commandments
display was first erected as a stand-alone display and then became part
of a historical display.322 The proposed test for a Ten Commandments
display that is part of a historical display after originally being a standalone display is:
A Ten Commandments display that is part of a historical
display after originally being a stand-alone display shall be
presumed constitutional unless it can be shown that the
context of the historical display has not significantly negated
the religious nature of the Ten Commandments.
This proposed test provides a presumption of constitutionality for
these displays to maintain consistency with all historical displays; in
appearance there are no differences between historical displays when the
Ten Commandments were originally part of the display and when they
were not. Furthermore, this proposed test still comports with the
holdings in Lynch and Allegheny declaring that the context of the display
is determinative.323 Although the Ten Commandments were originally

320
321
322
323
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See supra note 161.
See supra Part IV.A.
See supra Part V.A.; supra note 176.
See supra text accompanying notes 33-48, 55-70.
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displayed as a religious document, the new context negates the religious
nature of the Ten Commandments by surrounding them with historical
legal documents.
However, because government may have acted with an
impermissible purpose in erecting the first display of the Ten
Commandments, thereby including the display’s history in the context of
the historical display, government must put the Ten Commandments in
a context that will significantly negate the religious nature of the Ten
Commandments and erase any reminders that the Ten Commandments
once stood as a stand-alone display. To do this, government may have to
change the location of the Ten Commandments monument rather than
erect the other monuments at the location of the original Ten
Commandments display, or reframe the Ten Commandments to match
the other framed documents.
Although the test proposed by this Note discards the reasonable
person standard in analyzing each of the four types of public Ten
Commandments displays, it retains the emphasis from Lynch and
Allegheny that each display be analyzed within its context.324 This new
test proposes to begin the analysis of the display’s context by starting
with the type of the display, rather than with the knowledge of the
reasonable observer.325 By switching the focus to the type of display,
courts will begin their analysis from an objective standpoint. The result
will be that courts will hand down consistent opinions and that the
historical significance of the Ten Commandments and the civic
significance of long-standing displays will be recognized.
VI. CONCLUSION
In determining the constitutionality of religious displays, either
crèches, menorahs, or the Ten Commandments, the Supreme Court has
stated that the context of the display is determinative. Currently, the
context of the display is determined by the perceptions of the reasonable
observer, and because the reasonable observer is a hypothetical
construct, it must be imputed with knowledge. Supreme Court Justices
have disagreed on the knowledge of the reasonable observer; and
therefore, lower courts often impute the reasonable observer with
varying levels of knowledge. The result is that courts hand down
inconsistent decisions and that the historical significance of the Ten
324
325

See supra Parts V.B.1-4.
See supra Part V.A.
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Commandments and the civic significance of already existing standalone displays are not recognized.
This Note proposes a new test in analyzing Ten Commandments
displays. Like the reasonable observer standard, this proposed test
focuses on the context of the display; it looks at such factors as the age of
the display, the location of the display, and the documents in the display.
However, the starting point for this proposed test is the type of display.
By focusing on the type of display, courts are starting with the same
question and the same four types of displays to choose from; courts are
no longer starting with many different reasonable observers who have
varying degrees of knowledge. This will lead to more consistent
holdings. In addition, focusing on the type of display will allow longstanding displays and historical displays to be declared constitutional
because the proposed test recognizes that, although inherently religious,
certain Ten Commandments displays have civic and historical value.
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